Acceptance of alternative accommodation by tenants in road widening schemes constitutes implied surrender of tenancy rights.

The plaintiff (owner) filed suits for possession and damages against defendants who were originally tenants in shops located on Ashram Road, Ahmedabad

In 1986, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) initiated road widening, affecting these shops. The tenants moved the High Court in 1986, resulting in a scheme where the AMC provided alternative accommodations at a subsidized rent in lieu of compensation

The shops were subsequently demolished. However, defendants re-entered/remained in a small, dilapidated portion (approx. 2 feet wide) of the original site after occupying the new sites

The trial court decreed the suits, ordering eviction and damages of ₹1000/month

The defendants appealed, asserting that they remained "tenants" under the protection of the Bombay Rent Act and that the City Civil Court lacked jurisdiction

The Court applied Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the inherent jurisdiction of Civil Courts

It interpreted the doctrine of "implied surrender" of tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the context of accepting alternative sites

It further relied on the principle of Vigilantibus non dormientibus jure subventiunt (law assists the vigilant), citing Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam

Regarding the negligence of counsel as a ground for relief, the court applied the precedent from Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd. and Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, which holds that a litigant cannot shift entire blame to their advocate to undo judicial proceedings

The Court reasoned that the 1986 High Court order and the subsequent AMC scheme established that alternative accommodations were provided specifically in lieu of the compensation and the loss of the original tenanted premises

By accepting these new sites and shifting their businesses, the tenants' rights in the original suit shops were extinguished through implied surrender

The Court found no evidence (such as rent receipts post-1990) to prove a continuing landlord-tenant relationship

Consequently, any re-entry into the non-demolished "sliver" of land was held to be the act of a "rank trespasser" or "encroacher" rather than a tenant

Since no relationship governed by the Rent Act existed, Section 28 of said Act did not bar the City Civil Court’s jurisdiction

The Court also rejected the request for a remand, noting the defendants had failed to cross-examine the plaintiff despite multiple opportunities and could not now plead "negligence of counsel" to reopen the case

It held that the defendants lost their tenancy rights upon accepting alternative accommodation and their current status is that of rank trespassers

The City Civil Court properly exercised jurisdiction

The defendants were ordered to vacate the premises and pay damages as decreed. All interim stays were vacated, and the request for a further stay on the judgment was rejected