Acquisition proceedings lapse under Section 11A when the award fails to determine compensation for the affected land.

The petitioners challenged the notification dated 09.11.1993 issued under Section 4 and the declaration dated 19.06.1995 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”), by which their lands at Dhani Poonchla Wali, Neemkathana, District Sikar, were acquired for expansion of a RIICO industrial area.

The petitioners’ lands, measuring 0.51 hectare each and comprised in Khasra Nos. 364/4, 364/3 and 364/5, were substantially occupied by residential houses and formed part of the local abadi, although parts were recorded as banjar or used agriculturally.

They objected under Section 5A, asserting that residential land was being acquired despite the availability of adjoining banjar and barani land, and that intervening pasture, cremation-ground and other lands had been excluded from the acquisition.

An award dated 20.06.1997 covered other acquired lands but expressly did not assess compensation for the petitioners’ lands.

Earlier dismissals of the writ petitions were set aside in intra-court appeals, and the matters were remanded for fresh consideration on 19.02.2018.

Whether the acquisition notifications and declaration were invalid because the Section 5A enquiry and the Government’s satisfaction under Section 6 were vitiated by non-application of mind, failure to consider relevant objections, and absence of reasons.

Whether acquisition for RIICO required compliance with Part VII of the 1894 Act governing acquisition for companies.

Whether the acquisition proceedings lapsed under Section 11A of the 1894 Act because no valid award determining compensation for the petitioners’ lands was made within the prescribed period.

Whether the respondents could rely on the acquisition and utilisation of other lands, acceptance of compensation by other landowners, or Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”) to sustain the petitioners’ acquisition.

The Court applied Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, read with Article 300A of the Constitution.

Section 5A confers a valuable and substantive right to object to compulsory acquisition, requiring an effective hearing, objective consideration of objections, reasoned recommendations by the Collector and independent application of mind by the appropriate Government before issuing a Section 6 declaration.

The Court relied on Munshi Singh v. Union of India, Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, Dev Sharan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Radhy Shyam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana, which establish that Section 5A is not an empty formality and that objections concerning residential occupation, suitability, alternative land, comparative hardship and arbitrariness must be meaningfully considered.

Acquisition legislation is expropriatory and must be strictly construed; compulsory deprivation of property must be fair, reasonable and authorised by law.

Under Section 11A, an award determining compensation must be made within two years from publication of the Section 6 declaration, excluding only the period during which proceedings were actually stayed by a court.

RIICO, being a Government Company owned and controlled by the State, was excluded from the definition of “Company” under Section 3(e), read with Section 3(cc), and therefore Part VII was inapplicable.

Although expansion of an industrial area constituted a legitimate public purpose, the Court held that this did not authorise arbitrary selection of private land.

The preliminary Tehsildar report had already disclosed substantial residential occupation, and the petitioners’ Section 5A objections specifically raised the existence of houses, alternative banjar and barani land, the exclusion of intervening khasras and the discriminatory retention of their lands.

The Land Acquisition Officer’s report merely stated that the objections were baseless and that acquisition would not adversely affect the petitioners; it did not examine the residential character of the land, the availability of alternatives, the intervening lands or the differential treatment of released parcels.

Consequently, the report contained conclusions without supporting reasons and could not provide a lawful foundation for the Government’s satisfaction under Section 6.

The Part VII challenge failed because RIICO was a State-controlled Government Company, but that finding did not cure the defective Section 5A process.

Independently, the 20.06.1997 award did not assess compensation for the petitioners’ lands and therefore could not constitute a valid award in respect of them.

The interim status quo order could justify exclusion only for the period it remained operative; it ceased upon dismissal of the writ petitions in 2006/2007, and the respondents showed no subsequent restraint or valid award within the statutory period.

Acceptance of compensation by other landowners and development of the remaining acquired land could not validate an acquisition independently unlawful qua the petitioners.

It quashed and set aside, insofar as they concerned the petitioners’ lands measuring 0.51 hectare each in Khasra Nos. 364/4, 364/3 and 364/5, the Section 4 notification dated 09.11.1993 and the Section 6 declaration dated 19.06.1995.

It further held that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 11A because no valid award determining compensation for the petitioners’ lands was made within the prescribed period.

The respondents were restrained from proceeding with acquisition of those lands pursuant to the impugned notifications, and pending applications were disposed of.