Acquittal and reinstatement do not automatically entitle an employee to full salary for the suspension period.

The petitioner, a Peon employed with the respondent Municipal Corporation, was arrested in connection with an FIR alleging offences under Sections 399 and 402 IPC, Section 13 of the M.P. Dacoity Act, and Section 25(1)(B) of the Arms Act.

As he remained in judicial custody for more than 48 hours, he was deemed to have been placed under suspension under Rule 9(2)(a) of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, with effect from 31 August 2013.

Following investigation and trial, the petitioner was acquitted by the competent criminal court on 31 July 2017.

The respondent thereafter revoked his suspension and reinstated him by order dated 6 October 2018, but denied him arrears or the difference in salary for the suspension period.

Whether an employee acquitted in criminal proceedings is automatically entitled to full pay, allowances, or other monetary benefits for the period during which he remained under suspension?

Whether the respondent’s decision to revoke the petitioner’s suspension and reinstate him without granting salary arrears for the suspension period was legally unsustainable under Fundamental Rule 54-B?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to interest on the alleged arrears of salary?

The Court applied Fundamental Rule 54-B(1), under which the competent authority must specifically determine the pay and allowances payable for the suspension period and whether that period is to be treated as duty; under Rule 54-B(3), full pay and allowances are payable only where the competent authority forms the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified.

Rule 9(1) and Rule 9(2)(a) of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 permit or require suspension where criminal proceedings are pending and deem an employee suspended from the date of detention exceeding 48 hours.

Relying on Raj Narain v. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 809; Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155; Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541; Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121; and Sukhdarshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 14 SCC 531, the Court held that acquittal or reinstatement does not ipso facto confer a right to back wages.

The competent authority must assess whether the suspension was wholly unjustified, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the principle of “no work, no pay,” and whether the employee’s exclusion from service was attributable to the employer.

The petitioner’s suspension arose from his arrest and detention in a criminal case for more than 48 hours, rather than from any action initiated by the respondent to wrongfully keep him out of service.

Under Rule 9(2)(a), the suspension followed by operation of law, and the petitioner’s subsequent acquittal did not retrospectively render that suspension wholly unjustified.

Applying the Division Bench’s reasoning in Vijay Kumar Sharma, the Court held that Fundamental Rule 54-B does not create an automatic entitlement to full salary after acquittal; such entitlement depends upon a determination by the competent authority that the suspension was wholly unjustified.

The Court further relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions recognising that an employee who is absent because of his own involvement in criminal proceedings cannot ordinarily claim salary for the period during which no work was performed, particularly where the employer was not responsible for the prosecution or suspension.

Since the petitioner could not distinguish the controlling Division Bench decision or establish that the respondent’s action was legally impermissible, no ground for judicial interference under Article 226 was made out.

It held that acquittal and reinstatement do not, by themselves, entitle an employee to full salary, allowances, or other monetary benefits for the suspension period; the entitlement depends on a finding by the competent authority that the suspension was wholly unjustified.

As the petitioner’s suspension resulted from his own detention in a criminal case and was not attributable to the respondent, he had no enforceable right to salary arrears or interest.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, with no further order.