Acquittal cannot be disturbed absent perversity or compelling and substantial reasons for interference.

The prosecution alleged that a dispute arose when accused Raghupat Singh unloaded bricks in the informant’s field, which the informant’s son resisted. The accused allegedly formed an unlawful assembly, assaulted several persons, and fired firearms. Santosh Kumar Singh allegedly shot Sampat Singh, who later died, while other accused allegedly injured Pramod Singh, Ram Sunder Singh and Nilu Kumari with firearms and other weapons.

On the informant’s fardbeyan, Shivsagar P.S. Case No. 34 of 1999 was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 325, 324, 307 and 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

The Additional District and Sessions Judge-IX, Rohtas, acquitted all accused on 19 November 2024, finding the prosecution evidence materially inconsistent and noting the absence of reliable proof regarding the place of occurrence, the weapons, and forensic examination of the pellets and firearm.

The State preferred an appeal against acquittal, while Maya Kuer filed a connected criminal appeal. The delay of 146 days in the State’s appeal was condoned.

Whether the trial court’s judgment acquitting the accused suffered from illegality, perversity or unreasonableness warranting interference in an appeal against acquittal?

Whether the prosecution had proved the place and manner of occurrence, including the identity and use of the firearm allegedly causing Sampat Singh’s death, beyond reasonable doubt?

Whether the inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the non-examination of material and independent witnesses rendered the prosecution case unreliable?

The appeals were considered under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with reference to the corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, against an order of acquittal.

The prosecution was required to establish the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 325, 324, 307 and 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act beyond reasonable doubt.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but interference is justified only where the acquittal is perverse, clearly unreasonable, illegal, or based on compelling and substantial reasons. Where two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused should ordinarily be maintained, having regard to the strengthened presumption of innocence after acquittal.

The Court relied on Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479 and Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450.

The High Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the alleged place of occurrence. The Investigating Officer found no bricks at the informant’s field, no bullet or cartridge, and no bloodstains at the alleged spot; bricks were instead found on the field of an accused, and no documentary evidence established the informant’s title or possession over the land.

The prosecution also withheld material witnesses, including the informant’s son, who was allegedly assaulted first, and the informant’s daughter, who allegedly reported that assault. No independent village witness was examined despite the alleged occurrence taking place in a populated village.

The Court further accepted the trial court’s doubts regarding the testimony of PW-1 and PW-5. PW-1 claimed to have been assaulted but neither alleged any injury requiring examination nor underwent medical examination. PW-5’s claim that he snatched and broke the firearm allegedly used by Santosh Singh was considered unnatural and unsupported.

The alleged murder weapon was not produced before the trial court; the seized firearm was said to be broken, and neither it nor the six pellets recovered from the deceased’s body was subjected to forensic or ballistic examination. Consequently, the prosecution could not connect the alleged firearm with the fatal injury or establish the manner of occurrence beyond reasonable doubt.

These deficiencies created reasonable doubt and did not render the trial court’s view perverse or unsustainable.

Applying the restricted standard for interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Court dismissed both the State’s Government Appeal and Maya Kuer’s Criminal Appeal at the admission stage.

The delay of 146 days in the State’s appeal was condoned, pending applications were disposed of, and the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee was directed to pay ₹5,000 to the appointed amicus curiae.