Acquittal in a corruption case stands where demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are unproved.

The State, through the Karnataka Lokayukta Police, appealed the acquittal of the respondent, a Panchayat Development Officer, who had been charged under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The prosecution alleged that he demanded ₹5,000 from the complainant for allotting work under the National Rural Employment Scheme and accepted the money during a trap.

The trial court acquitted the respondent.

The complainant, examined as PW1, denied the demand and the complaint’s contents; the prosecution also did not examine the beneficiaries named in the work-allotment records.

The State appealed under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Whether the State-Lokayukta had established grounds to interfere with the trial court’s judgment of acquittal.

What order should follow from the Court’s determination of that issue.

The Court considered Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which were the provisions under which the respondent had been charged.

It applied the principles governing appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: an appellate court may reappraise the evidence, but an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence; where the trial court’s view is a possible view on the evidence, the appellate court should not substitute another view.

Interference is warranted where the acquittal is perverse, materially misreads or omits evidence, or no reasonable view other than guilt is available.

The Court cited Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, Babu Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka for these principles.

The Court found no basis to displace the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.

PW1 denied that the respondent had demanded ₹5,000 and disowned the complaint’s contents, while the trial court had identified weaknesses in the supporting witnesses’ evidence.

The beneficiaries named in Ex.P29 were not examined, and that document showed that work had been allotted to the complainant and others on 18 February 2011, before the complaint and trap on 24 February 2011.

In light of those evidentiary gaps, the trial court’s conclusion that demand and acceptance had not been proved was a possible view; the appellate standard did not permit reversal merely because another view might be available.

The appeal was dismissed, and the trial court’s judgment of acquittal remained undisturbed.