Acquittal in a criminal case does not mandate exoneration from independent departmental disciplinary proceedings.

The appellant served as a Graduate Teacher (BT Assistant) in English at Government PUMS, Nadappanahalli, Dharmapuri District.

She attained the age of superannuation on 31.05.2025 but was not allowed to retire; instead, she was placed under suspension on the ground that a criminal case in C.C.No.14 of 2018 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was pending against her.

The trial court convicted her, sentencing her to four months' simple imprisonment and directing payment of compensation of Rs.2,90,000/-; her Criminal Appeal was dismissed, confirming the conviction, but her Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court was allowed and she was acquitted.

Meanwhile, departmental disciplinary proceedings were initiated and a charge memo was issued; during the pendency of those proceedings, the acquittal was recorded.

The appellant's writ petition challenging the suspension order (W.P.No.41622 of 2025) was dismissed on 06.11.2025, giving rise to the present Writ Appeal, which also sought disbursement of retirement benefits.

1. Whether an order of acquittal in a criminal case entitles a Government servant to exoneration from pending departmental disciplinary proceedings arising from the same subject matter?

2. Whether the order of suspension passed on the eve of the appellant's superannuation, with services extended under the Fundamental Rules, is liable to be revoked or set aside?

the procedures in the two fora are distinct and different; while strict proof is required for criminal conviction, no such strict evidence is required to punish a Government employee under the Discipline Appeal Rules; acquittal in a criminal case is not a ground to seek exoneration from disciplinary proceedings; and preponderance of probabilities suffices to punish an employee under the Conduct Rules.

a criminal judgment is not determinative of disciplinary proceedings, and that even upon acquittal, the department is empowered to independently conduct a domestic enquiry and decide on merits in accordance with law.

Fundamental Rules governing extension of service under suspension beyond the date of superannuation.

Applying the above principles, the Court held that the appellant's acquittal in the Criminal Revision Petition could not, per se, constitute a ground for exoneration from the pending departmental disciplinary proceedings, since the two proceedings operate in distinct spheres with different standards of proof—criminal conviction requiring strict proof while disciplinary penalty rests on preponderance of probabilities.

The department therefore remained empowered to independently conclude the domestic enquiry on merits.

On the suspension issue, the Court reasoned that since the appellant was placed under suspension on the eve of superannuation and her services stood extended under the Fundamental Rules, the question of revocation of suspension did not arise at all; an appropriate final order could be passed only upon conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings.

The Writ Appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. The Court directed the respondents to initiate all appropriate actions to ensure that the departmental disciplinary proceedings are concluded as expeditiously as possible, and to pass an appropriate final order on merits and in accordance with law thereafter.