Acquittal in criminal proceedings not initiated by the employer does not entitle the employee to back wages.

The Petitioner, a Trained Graduate Teacher, was suspended on 18.01.2011 following his arrest in 2010 for various IPC offences, including Section 307.

He was convicted by a Sessions Court on 18.06.2013 and subsequently dismissed from service by the competent authority.

On 25.02.2019, the Allahabad High Court allowed his appeal and set aside the conviction.

Having reached the age of superannuation on 30.04.2018 while the appeal was pending, the Petitioner sought revocation of his dismissal and payment of back wages.

The Competent Authority reinstated him notionally, ordered that the period of absence be counted for pensionary purposes, and granted subsistence allowance for the suspension period, but denied back wages for the period of dismissal (21.05.2014 to 30.04.2018).

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) upheld this denial on 11.07.2022, leading to the present writ petition.

1. Whether an employee acquitted of criminal charges is entitled to back wages for the period of suspension and dismissal when the criminal proceedings were not initiated by the employer.

2. Whether the principle of "no work no pay" applies to a period of dismissal resulting from a conviction that is later overturned on appeal.

The court primarily relied on the precedent set in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujrat Electricity Board, which established that back wages are not a matter of right if an employee’s own conduct (involvement in a crime) disabled them from rendering service.

It further applied the doctrine from Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, holding that a department cannot be held liable for back wages when it is legally bound to keep a convicted employee out of service, provided the prosecution was not at the behest of the department.

The court also distinguished Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapal Mahavidyalaya, noting that the "normal rule" of granting back wages applies only to wrongful or mala fide terminations by the employer, not to those necessitated by operation of law following a conviction.

Finally, it applied the principle from Raj Narain v. Union of India, which limits employer liability for back wages to cases where criminal proceedings were initiated with mala fide or vexatious intent by the employer.

The court reasoned that the Petitioner’s exclusion from service was not an act of illegal or wrongful termination by the Respondents, but a mandatory legal consequence of his conviction by a competent Sessions Court.

Since the criminal proceedings (FIR No. 35/2008) were initiated by the police and not the employer, the Respondents cannot be faulted for the Petitioner’s inability to perform his duties.

The court observed that the Petitioner remained out of service due to his own involvement in a criminal case, and applying the principle of "no work no pay," the employer cannot be compelled to pay for services never rendered.

The court specifically rejected the Petitioner's reliance on Deepali Gundu Surwase, clarifying that since there was no mala fide intent or procedural illegality on the part of the department, the Petitioner did not meet the criteria for an exception to the general rule against back wages.

The court held that the Petitioner is not entitled to back wages for the period of dismissal because the Respondents did not unlawfully prevent him from discharging his duties; rather, his conviction had disabled him from rendering service.

The relief was limited to the already granted subsistence allowance and the counting of the period from 2010 to 2018 for pensionary purposes only.