Acquittal must stand where contradictory dying declaration and FIR leave abetment unproved.

The respondent-accused, husband of deceased Nurabibi, was prosecuted under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

The prosecution alleged that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband on account of his suspicion regarding her character and that, on 16 December 1993, she committed suicide by pouring kerosene on herself and setting herself on fire.

She was taken to hospital, where an FIR was recorded and her dying declaration was subsequently recorded by an Executive Magistrate. She died during treatment on 21 December 1993.

After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and the trial court acquitted the accused on 7 May 2009 in Sessions Case No. 281 of 1994.

The State preferred an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

1. Whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 498A and 306 IPC

2. Whether the trial court properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution

3. Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal suffered from illegality, irregularity or perversity warranting appellate interference

The Court applied Sections 498A and 306 IPC, requiring proof of cruelty and abetment of suicide, respectively, and referred to Section 107 IPC concerning abetment.

It observed that presumptions under Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot substitute for proof of the statutory ingredients, particularly evidence of incitement or abetment.

On dying declarations, the Court relied on Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2023 SC 4129, which requires assessment of voluntariness, consistency, absence of tutoring or prompting, proper recording, the declarant’s fitness, and the surrounding circumstances.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but the accused enjoys a strengthened or “double” presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed.

These principles were drawn from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

The Court found that the prosecution case rested substantially on the FIR and the dying declaration, but the two accounts materially contradicted each other.

In the dying declaration, the deceased stated that her husband immediately rescued her and took her to hospital; in the FIR, she stated that neighbours and her mother responded to her cries, extinguished the fire and took her to hospital.

The dying declaration was further considered doubtful because the Executive Magistrate had not obtained a medical endorsement or certificate confirming that the deceased was conscious and mentally fit to make the statement.

The deceased’s mother and another material witness did not support the prosecution, the panch witnesses turned hostile, and no independent neighbour testified regarding cruelty or harassment.

Even assuming the FIR and dying declaration to be true, the Court held that they did not establish the requisite incitement or abetment necessary for conviction under Section 306 IPC, nor did they provide reliable proof of sustained cruelty under Section 498A IPC.

Applying the restrictive standard governing interference with acquittal, the Court concluded that the trial court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor legally infirm.

It held that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges under Sections 498A and 306 IPC beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court had properly appreciated the evidence.

Finding no illegality, irregularity or perversity in the acquittal, the Court dismissed the State’s appeal and confirmed the trial court’s judgment dated 7 May 2009.

The bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.