Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt Does Not Bar Departmental Punishment on Preponderance of Probabilities

The respondent, a Head Constable in the Tamil Nadu Police Department, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules on two charges.

He denied the charges, but the departmental Enquiry Officer found them proved.

The disciplinary authority imposed reduction in pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect.

On appeal, the punishment was reduced to reduction in the time scale of pay by two stages for two years without cumulative effect; the review petition was rejected.

The criminal case arising from the same allegations ended in acquittal on the benefit of doubt.

Relying on the acquittal and the fact that witnesses had turned hostile in the departmental enquiry, the learned Single Judge allowed the respondent’s writ petition and set aside the punishment.

The State authorities challenged that order in the present intra-court appeal.

1. Whether an acquittal in a criminal case on the benefit of doubt, arising from the same allegations, automatically entitles the delinquent government servant to exoneration in departmental disciplinary proceedings

2. Whether the departmental authorities’ finding of misconduct, based on the standard of preponderance of probabilities and the earlier statements of witnesses who subsequently turned hostile, was legally sustainable

3. Whether the punishment, as modified by the appellate authority, warranted further interference by the writ court

The Court applied Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules governing disciplinary proceedings against police personnel.

It reiterated that criminal proceedings and departmental disciplinary proceedings are distinct; departmental proceedings are not dependent on the outcome of the criminal case; and an acquittal on the benefit of doubt does not by itself establish entitlement to departmental exoneration.

The Court further held that criminal liability must be established by strict proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas departmental misconduct may be established on a preponderance of probabilities, and the disciplinary authority may draw reasonable factual inferences from the available material.

It also applied the principle that greater discipline is expected from members of uniformed forces and that such discipline cannot ordinarily be compromised.

The criminal court’s acquittal was based only on the benefit of doubt and was therefore not equivalent to a finding that the allegations were false or that the respondent was fully exonerated.

The departmental authorities were entitled to apply the lesser standard of preponderance of probabilities.

Although the complainant and other witnesses turned hostile during the departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority relied on their earlier statements and on the statements of other witnesses, recording a specific finding that the evidence established the first charge and that the witnesses had turned hostile to favour the delinquent.

The appellate authority had already considered the respondent’s length of service and clean disciplinary record and substantially reduced the punishment.

Since the authorities had considered the respondent’s defence and their conclusions were not perverse, the writ court was not justified in substituting its view or granting further leniency.

The disciplinary and appellate authorities had acted within the applicable legal principles, and the modified punishment did not warrant further interference.

The writ order dated 29 September 2022 in W.P. No. 15332 of 2010 was set aside; the writ appeal was allowed, with no order as to costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.