Acquittal on benefit of doubt does not entitle employee to back wages under "No Work No Pay" principle.

The Appellant was appointed as a Panchayat Karmi and later designated as a Panchayat Secretary.

In 2001, he was implicated in a criminal case (Crime No. 117/2001) for offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 420 of the IPC and remained in judicial custody from August 8, 2001, to October 5, 2001.

Consequently, he was terminated/de-notified by the Collector on May 1, 2002.

On December 30, 2017, the trial court acquitted the Appellant by extending the "benefit of doubt".

Following a High Court direction in a previous writ petition, the Respondent reinstated the Appellant on April 26, 2019, but denied back wages and continuity of service for the intervening period (2002–2019) based on the principle of "No Work No Pay".

The Appellant challenged this denial, but the Single Judge dismissed his writ petition on August 28, 2024.

Whether an employee acquitted on the "benefit of doubt" is entitled to full back wages and continuity of service upon reinstatement.

Whether the principle of "No Work No Pay" was validly applied to the intervening period between termination and reinstatement.

The Court primarily applied Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, which mandates that full pay and allowances upon reinstatement are contingent on the employee being "fully exonerated".

It relied on the Supreme Court precedent in Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994), which distinguishes between "honourable acquittal" and acquittal on "benefit of doubt" for the purpose of service benefits.

Furthermore, it applied the principle from Union Territory, Chandigarh v. Brijmohan Kaur (2005), establishing that wages are generally not payable for periods where no service was rendered.

The Division Bench ruling in Rakesh Kumar Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019), which held that public exchequer funds should not be used for service benefits where acquittal is not an honourable exoneration.

The Court reasoned that under Rule 54(2) of the Fundamental Rules, the entitlement to back wages depends on whether the employee was "fully exonerated".

Upon perusing the criminal court's judgment, the Bench found that the Appellant’s acquittal was not "honourable" but resulted from the prosecution’s failure to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Since the Appellant was out of service due to his own involvement in a criminal case and not due to malicious prosecution by the employer, the principle of "No Work No Pay" was deemed applicable.

The Court noted that the competent authority exercised its jurisdiction under Rule 54(1) to treat the intervening period as "No Work No Pay," and such a decision was neither arbitrary nor a jurisdictional error.

The Bench upheld the Single Judge’s order, affirming that the Appellant is not entitled to back wages or continuity of service for the period from May 1, 2002, to April 26, 2019.

The writ appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.