Acquittal on compromise or benefit of doubt does not guarantee appointment to sensitive posts.

The applicant, Raju Nath, applied for the Delhi Police Constable (Exe.) Male Examination 2023.

He disclosed his involvement in two FIRs during the attestation process: FIR No. 360/2019 (PS JNV Colony, Bikaner, Rajasthan, u/s 323, 341, 34 & 3(1)(S) of SC & ST ACT) and FIR No. 198/2020 (PS JNV Colony, Bikaner, Rajasthan, u/s 323, 341, and 143 IPC).

In FIR No. 360/2019, he was acquitted by the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Bikaner, on 02.11.2022, after none of the prosecution witnesses identified him as having committed any offence.

In FIR No. 198/2020, he was acquitted by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner, on 20.03.2021, by way of compromise between the parties.

Despite these acquittals, the respondents issued a show-cause notice dated 27.02.2024, proposing cancellation of his candidature, leading to the impugned order dated 04.11.2024.

The Screening Committee examined the records on 26.04.2024 and concluded that the acquittal in FIR No. 198/2020 was due to compromise, and in FIR No. 360/2019, witnesses may have been influenced, thus the acquittals could not be treated as “honourable acquittal”.

The Committee decided that the offences involved were serious and fell under the category of moral turpitude as per Annexure ‘A’ of Standing Order No. HRD/12/2022.

1. Whether the applicant's acquittal in the criminal cases automatically entitles him to appointment in the Delhi Police?

2. Whether the Screening Committee validly exercised its discretion in cancelling the applicant's candidature based on the nature of the alleged offences and the circumstances of his acquittals?

The court primarily applied Standing Order No. HRD/12/2022 issued by the Delhi Police, which outlines the procedure for assessing suitability for appointment of candidates involved in criminal cases.

This Standing Order specifies that mere acquittal does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment and permits the Screening Committee to consider antecedents, the nature and extent of involvement, whether acquittal was on compromise/benefit of doubt/witnesses turning hostile or honorably, and the nature and gravity of the charge.

It also categorizes serious offences involving moral turpitude in Annexure 'A', which includes sections like 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 341 (wrongful restraint), 325 (grievous hurt), 143 (unlawful assembly) of the IPC, and Section 3(1)(S) of the SC/ST Act.

The court also relied on precedents from the Hon’ble Supreme Court: CP Delhi v. Mehar Singh (Civil Appeal No. 4842/2012), CP Delhi v. Shani Kumar (Civil Appeal No. 4965/2012), Union of India v. Methu Meda (2022 1 SCC 1), and Avtar Singh v. Union of India ((2016) 8 SCC 471), which establish that a Screening Committee has the authority to assess a candidate's suitability despite acquittal, especially in sensitive posts, and that acquittals on compromise or benefit of doubt may not be treated as "honourable".

The Tribunal analyzed the case within the framework of Standing Order No. HRD/12/2022, noting that the offences the applicant was charged with (including under Sections 323, 341, 325, 143 IPC, and Section 3(1)(S) of the SC/ST Act) fall under the category of "serious offence(s) involving moral turpitude" as per Annexure 'A' of the said Standing Order.

The Screening Committee, acting under this policy, considered that one acquittal was based on compromise and that in the other case, despite acquittal, the offences involved assault and SC/ST Act violations, and witnesses might have been influenced.

The Tribunal emphasized that the Committee's role is to assess suitability for service, considering integrity, discipline, and the sensitive nature of the post, rather than re-appreciating evidence.

It found that the policy explicitly allows for evaluation of antecedents even after acquittal, particularly when acquittals are due to compromise or benefit of doubt, and that public trust is paramount.

Given the legal precedents empowering Screening Committees to consider the nature and gravity of criminal cases, the Tribunal concluded that the Committee’s decision was within its discretionary bounds and not arbitrary.

It found that the Screening Committee acted within legal parameters and the discretion provided by Standing Order No. HRD/12/2022.

Therefore, the present Original Application was dismissed.

No costs were awarded.