Acquittal upheld where common intention is not charged and individual liability is unproven.

The State of Chhattisgarh filed an acquittal appeal under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. challenging the judgment dated 27.06.2018 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Durg.

The respondents, along with a deceased accused (Ishwar) and an absconding accused (Ramu Telgu), were charged under Section 307 of the IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act for allegedly assaulting the victim, Raja Naykar (PW-5), with a knife.

During the trial, the injured eye-witness (PW-5) provided inconsistent testimony regarding the involvement of the respondents when confronted with his prior statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C.

Furthermore, the Investigating Officer (PW-8) testified that the injuries were caused by the deceased accused, Ishwar, and that respondent Kailash did not cause any injury.

1. Whether the High Court should interfere with an order of acquittal if the trial court’s view is a "possible view" based on the evidence.

2. Whether the acquittal of the respondents for offences under Section 307 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act suffered from patent perversity or misreading of material evidence.

The Court primarily applied Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. regarding appeals against acquittal.

It relied on the principles established in Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Another v. State of Uttarakhand (2025 INSC 11) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149, which dictate that an appellate court must respect the "double presumption of innocence" in favour of the accused.

The rule establishes that interference is only warranted if the judgment suffers from patent perversity, misreading of evidence, or if no two reasonable views are possible.

The Court observed that the testimony of the injured eye-witness (PW-5) was unreliable due to significant omissions and contradictions when compared to his previous legal statements.

Crucially, the Court noted that the Investigating Officer (PW-8) explicitly stated that the injury was caused by the deceased accused, Ishwar, and not by the respondents.

The Court further highlighted a procedural gap: the respondents were only charged under Section 307 IPC individually, and not in conjunction with Section 34 IPC (common intention).

Consequently, applying the restrictive standards for reversing acquittals, the Court found that the trial court's decision was a reasonable and possible view based on the record, as the prosecution failed to prove the specific acts of the respondents beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court affirmed the acquittal of the respondents, concluding that no substantial grounds existed to disturb the trial court's findings.

The appeal was dismissed.