Acquittal upheld where contradictory eyewitness accounts and an unreliable dying declaration failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The deceased, Ranglabhai Vaghaliyabhai Dhanuk, owned three Mahua trees situated on land belonging to the accused, Shankarbhai Rupsingbhai Dhanuk.

A dispute arose when the accused allegedly sold one tree without informing the deceased.

The prosecution alleged that, on 19 September 1998 at about 7:00 p.m., the accused, armed with a bow and arrow, shot the deceased in the chest while he was returning from a funeral, causing injuries that proved fatal during treatment.

An FIR was registered as I.C.R. No. 66 of 1998 at Rangpur Police Station, and the accused was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

The prosecution relied on purported eyewitnesses, a complaint attributed to the deceased, a dying declaration, medical evidence, and recovery evidence.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara, acquitted the accused on 23 June 2000 in Sessions Case No. 5 of 1999.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the acquittal.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent-accused caused the fatal injuries to the deceased and was therefore guilty under Section 302 IPC?

2. Whether the dying declaration at Exhibit 15 was voluntary, truthful, reliable, and sufficient to sustain a conviction despite the absence of a medical endorsement regarding the deceased’s mental fitness and the inconsistencies concerning the place of occurrence?

3. Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference under Section 378 Cr.P.C.?

4. Whether the prosecution established the charge under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, including the applicable Collector’s notification?

The Court considered the prosecution charges under Section 302 IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

Under Section 378 Cr.P.C., an appellate court has power to review and reappreciate the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but the accused benefits from a double presumption of innocence, and an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views are possible, as reaffirmed in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415.

Regarding dying declarations, the Court applied Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474, holding that a conviction may rest solely on a dying declaration only when it is voluntary, truthful, consistent, and inspires confidence; a suspicious or infirm declaration cannot form the basis of conviction.

The Court also relied on Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 698, identifying factors such as the declarant’s mental fitness, absence of tutoring or prompting, proper recording, opportunity to observe the incident, consistency, voluntariness, and compatibility with the injuries.

The Court held that the prosecution evidence suffered from material contradictions that prevented proof of the accused’s identity and involvement beyond reasonable doubt.

P.W.1’s account was inconsistent regarding whether she was at home or present at the scene; P.W.4 admitted that she had been playing at home and arrived only after hearing shouts; and P.W.5 similarly appeared to have reached the scene after the occurrence.

Their accounts also conflicted regarding who brought the injured deceased home and who took him to the hospital.

The dying declaration was materially inconsistent with the eyewitness version because it placed the incident at the deceased’s house, whereas the witnesses described the occurrence as having taken place in a field; the scene map and investigation materials indicated yet another location.

Its reliability was further weakened because the Executive Magistrate did not obtain a medical endorsement certifying the deceased’s consciousness or mental fitness, while P.W.1 stated that the deceased had become unconscious after the injury.

Although the medical evidence established that the death was homicidal and caused by arrow injuries, it did not establish that those injuries were inflicted by the respondent.

The alleged weapon recovery was also not satisfactorily proved, and the prosecution failed to produce the Collector’s notification necessary to sustain the Section 135 Bombay Police Act charge.

Applying the restrictive principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court found the Trial Court’s view to be a reasonable one and not perverse.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent caused the deceased’s death and that the dying declaration was not sufficiently reliable to support conviction.

The prosecution also failed to establish the charge under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act because the relevant Collector’s notification was not proved.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal dated 23 June 2000 was confirmed.

If the respondent had been taken into custody pursuant to the non-bailable warrant, he was directed to be released forthwith; any bail or bail bonds were discharged, and the record and proceedings were ordered to be returned to the Trial Court.