Acquittal upheld where delayed reporting and material contradictions rendered the injured witness’s account unreliable.

The appellant alleged that on 04.07.1999, while he was ploughing land at Ranipur Jhal, Jwalapur, the accused—Sohan Singh, Kuldeep Singh @ Lakhmeer Singh and Paramjeet Singh—arrived armed with country-made pistols and fired at him.

An FIR under Section 307 IPC was lodged at 10:40 a.m.; the appellant had been medically examined at 10:30 a.m. and was found to have entry and exit firearm wounds on his right hand, although the X-ray showed no abnormality.

The investigation initially resulted in final reports, but proceedings were ultimately initiated and the accused were charged under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC.

The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of the appellant, two alleged eyewitnesses, medical evidence and the investigating officers.

The accused denied the allegations and asserted that the appellant had attempted to forcibly occupy their land and had himself opened fire, injuring Kuldeep Singh.

The trial court acquitted the accused on 14.01.2013, leading to the present appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, acting in furtherance of their common intention, fired at and attempted to cause the death of the appellant, thereby committing an offence under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC?

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was vitiated by an erroneous appreciation of the ocular, medical and investigative evidence so as to warrant appellate interference?

The court applied Section 307 IPC, which requires proof of an intention or knowledge to cause death accompanied by an overt act towards its execution; actual infliction of a fatal or grievous injury is not essential.

Relying on State of M.P. v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the court reiterated that an accused cannot be acquitted under Section 307 merely because the victim suffered simple injuries.

The prosecution nevertheless bears the burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt, and material contradictions, unexplained delay, unreliable eyewitness testimony and doubtful medical circumstances may create reasonable doubt requiring acquittal.

Section 34 IPC requires proof of a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention.

The court held that the appellant’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable or corroborated.

Although PW1 claimed that PW2 and PW3 reached the spot after the incident and took him to the police station, both witnesses denied accompanying him, and PW6 stated that the appellant had not come to the police station.

PW2 and PW3 did not establish themselves as eyewitnesses: they stated that they had merely heard gunshots, while the site plan did not indicate their position from which they could have witnessed the occurrence.

There were also material contradictions regarding whether the appellant fired from the tractor or while running away.

The delay between the alleged incident at approximately 7:45 a.m., medical examination at 10:30 a.m. and FIR registration at 10:40 a.m. was held to further weaken the prosecution case.

Although the medical evidence established entry and exit wounds, the normal X-ray, the unusual trajectory of the bullet through the hand, and the absence of reliable evidence regarding the manner of transportation to the hospital raised a genuine possibility that the injury was self-inflicted.

In view of these circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish the accused’s participation, common intention or the requisite intent under Section 307 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

It held that the prosecution evidence was materially inconsistent and insufficient to prove the charge under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

The trial court had rightly acquitted the accused, and no ground for appellate interference was made out.

Accordingly, the criminal appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and order of acquittal dated 14.01.2013 were affirmed.

A copy of the judgment along with the lower court record was directed to be forwarded to the concerned court for compliance.