Acquittal upheld where prosecution failed to prove forcible kidnapping or the ingredients of Sections 363 and 366 IPC.

The victim allegedly left home on 6 April 2009 to purchase spices from a nearby grocery shop but did not return. After a search, a missing-person entry was lodged, followed by FIR C.R. No. I-138/2009 at Salabatpura Police Station alleging offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code.

During investigation, it emerged that the victim had travelled to various places in Maharashtra and stayed with the accused for approximately one month. The accused was arrested, the relevant clothes were collected, and a charge-sheet was filed.

The victim’s school-leaving certificate recorded her date of birth as 4 February 1993, making her approximately 16 years and 2 months old at the time of the incident.

The trial court acquitted the accused in Sessions Case No. 157 of 2009 by judgment dated 27 February 2015. The State preferred an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused kidnapped or abducted the victim in violation of Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse, illegal, or based on a manifestly erroneous appreciation of the evidence so as to warrant appellate interference.

The Court applied Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC concerning kidnapping from lawful guardianship and kidnapping or abducting a woman with the intent that she may be compelled to marry or be forced or induced to illicit intercourse.

In an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has full power to reappreciate the evidence, but must account for the double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should ordinarily not be disturbed. These principles were drawn from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, and reaffirmed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, [2022] 3 SCC 471, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 / (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, [2024] 9 SCC 169.

Interference is justified only where the trial court’s view is manifestly illegal, unreasonable, or perverse.

The High Court found that the victim’s testimony did not reliably establish forcible kidnapping or abduction. Although she stated that the accused had forcibly taken her away, she admitted that she had not objected to or complained against him during the approximately one-month period in which she accompanied him and stayed at different places.

The evidence of the victim and the police witnesses also contained material contradictions and omissions, including the victim’s denial of statements attributed to her by the investigating officer.

The investigation did not sufficiently develop the allegations of force, inducement, or allurement. On reappreciation, the High Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential ingredients of Sections 363 and 366 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

Since the trial court’s view was a reasonable view of the evidence and was not perverse or manifestly illegal, the principles governing appeals against acquittal barred interference.

Finding no illegality, infirmity, or perversity in the trial court’s acquittal, the High Court dismissed the State’s appeal and confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal dated 27 February 2015. The accused’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.