Acquittal upheld where testimonies regarding caste-based insults and criminal intimidation lacked verbatim specificity and corroboration.

The appellant, a construction supervisor, filed an appeal against a trial court judgment dated March 15, 2024.

The original case arose from an incident on October 1, 2019, where an employee allegedly insulted the appellant using caste-based slurs and physically assaulted him with a wooden stick.

While the trial court convicted the accused for voluntary hurt and under specific provisions of the SC/ST Act, it acquitted them of charges involving public insults, intentional humiliation, and criminal intimidation.

The appellant challenged these specific acquittals, arguing that the witness testimonies and the FIR provided sufficient evidence for conviction.

1. Whether the prosecution provided sufficient and consistent evidence to establish the ingredients of intentional insult and humiliation in a public view under the SC/ST Act.

2. Whether the high court should interfere with a trial court’s judgment of acquittal when the view taken by the lower court is legally plausible.

Sections 294 (obscene acts/songs) and 506 Part II (criminal intimidation) of the IPC, alongside Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act regarding public humiliation.

The court relied on the principles governing appellate jurisdiction in acquittals established in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, emphasizing that a "possible view" by the trial court should not be overturned unless perverse.

Standards from Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka and Mallappa & others v. State of Karnataka, which mandate that appellate courts must demonstrate patent illegality or error of fact to reverse an acquittal.

The court found that the victim's testimony was insufficient because he failed to specify the exact nature of the slurs used or clarify how they caused him annoyance.

Although another witness provided more specific details, his statements were inconsistent with the FIR and the victim's own testimony.

The court noted that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant was genuinely intimidated by the alleged threats, especially since he proceeded to file a police report immediately.

In applying the established precedents, the court reasoned that the trial court’s decision to acquit based on these evidentiary gaps was a "plausible view".

Since the prosecution could not demonstrate that the trial court's appreciation of evidence was perverse or based on a misreading of the record, the high court determined that interference was not warranted.

The court affirmed the trial court’s findings, ruling that the acquittal was based on a proper appreciation of evidence; the appeal was dismissed for being devoid of merit.