Ad hoc stop-gap service cannot count toward seniority or consequential promotion.

The petitioner served as a Clerk on an ad hoc basis in the Agriculture Department from 3 February 1973 to 22 October 1973.

After selection through the Haryana S.S. Board, he joined the Irrigation Department on 11 December 1973 and was regularised on 2 April 1974.

He sought counting of his ad hoc service towards qualifying service, seniority and consequential deemed-date promotions, including promotion to Circle Superintendent.

The petitioner had earlier filed CWP-7640-2022 seeking substantially identical relief.

That petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to decide his representation.

The representation was rejected by order dated 22 June 2022 on the ground that the ad hoc service could count for increments and leave, but not for seniority or promotion, and that the case of Chander Singh was distinguishable because it involved military-service benefits under applicable rules.

Whether the present writ petition was maintainable when the petitioner had previously sought substantially identical relief in CWP-7640-2022?

Whether the petitioner’s ad hoc service from 3 February 1973 to 22 October 1973 could be counted for determining seniority and granting consequential deemed-date promotions?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to rely on the decision in Chander Singh for counting his ad hoc service towards seniority and promotion?

Whether the claim was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, particularly when the petitioner retired on 31 December 2009 but raised the claim only in 2022?

The Court applied the doctrine of constructive res judicata, holding that a subsequent writ petition is barred where the relief sought is identical in substance to that pursued in an earlier proceeding.

It also relied on the Haryana Government instructions dated 29 March 1957, under which temporary or ad hoc service rendered without recommendation of the competent Selection Board may be counted for increments and leave, but not for seniority.

Relying on State of Haryana v. Haryana Veterinary and A.H.T.S. Association, the Court held that only service rendered as a member of the regular service can ordinarily be counted for the relevant service benefits.

The Court further applied the principles in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and Malook Singh v. State of Punjab, that ad hoc service rendered pursuant to a stop-gap appointment not made according to the prescribed recruitment rules cannot be counted for seniority, unless the initial appointment itself was made in accordance with the applicable rules.

The Court also applied the principle that stale claims concerning seniority and promotion may be rejected for delay and laches.

The Court found that the relief claimed in the earlier and present writ petitions was identical in substance: deemed-date promotion on all posts, including Circle Superintendent, after counting the petitioner’s ad hoc service.

The present petition was therefore barred by constructive res judicata.

On merits, the Court held that the petitioner’s ad hoc appointment was a temporary, stop-gap arrangement made without the recommendation of the S.S. Board.

Under the 1957 Government instructions and the applicable Supreme Court precedents, such service could not be counted for seniority or promotion, although the petitioner had already received the permissible benefits of increments and leave.

The Court rejected reliance on Chander Singh because that case concerned military-service benefits available under the Punjab Military Service Concession Rules, 1965; the inclusion of a short period of ad hoc service in that case was part of the implementation of a distinct military-service concession and did not create a general precedent.

The Court additionally held that the claim was grossly delayed, having been raised approximately twelve years after the petitioner’s retirement.

The petitioner did not controvert these legal and factual findings.

It held that the petition was barred by constructive res judicata, that the petitioner’s ad hoc service could not be counted for seniority or consequential deemed-date promotions, and that the claim was independently liable to fail on account of delay and laches.

The impugned order dated 22 June 2022 was consequently upheld, and any pending applications were disposed of.