Additional compensation under Section 30(3) applies to market value inclusive of the statutory multiplication factor.

The petitioners challenged an award dated 19.03.2020 / 05.08.2020 regarding land acquisition under the National Highways Act, 1956.

While the competent authority determined the market value by applying a multiplication factor of 2 (for rural areas) as per Section 26(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”), it calculated the 12% additional compensation under Section 30(3) only on the "base market value" (Section 26(1)).

The petitioners sought the inclusion of the multiplication factor in the 12% calculation, interest under Section 80, and benefits under the Second (Rehabilitation & Resettlement) and Third (Infrastructural Amenities) Schedules of the 2013 Act.

The Court applied Section 26 (Determination of market value) and Section 30(3) (Award of 12% additional compensation) of the 2013 Act, interpreting "market value" under Section 3(u) as the value determined in accordance with the entirety of Section 26, including the multiplication factor in Section 26(2).

It relied on the principle that the same expression used in different parts of a statute carries the same meaning (Farrel v. Alexander).

The Court further applied Section 80 of the 2013 Act regarding interest on delayed compensation.

the principles of estoppel and laches regarding belated claims for R&R benefits.

The Court reasoned that "market value" is defined by the 2013 Act as the value determined under Section 26. Since Section 26(2) explicitly mandates the application of a multiplication factor to the base value calculated under Section 26(1), the final "market value" must include this factor.

The use of the phrase "such market value" in Section 30(3) refers back to the value determined under Section 26 in its entirety; thus, the 12% additional compensation—designed to offset inflation during acquisition—must be calculated on the factor-multiplied value.

Regarding interest, the Court held that since the full compensation was not paid at the time of the award, interest under Section 80 (9% and 15%) is mandatory.

However, the Court rejected the claims for Second and Third Schedule benefits, observing that the petitioners failed to raise these grievances during the 2015-2016 acquisition proceedings and approached the Court after a significant delay (four years), thereby attracting the principle of acquiescence.

The Court awarded statutory interest under Section 80 on the unpaid amount, restricted to a period of three years from the date of the award due to the petitioners' delay in filing the writ.

The prayer for benefits under the Second and Third Schedules was rejected due to delay and laches.

The competent authority was directed to pass the modified award within six weeks.