Administrative approval delays do not constitute sufficient cause to condone the State’s delay in appeal.

The State and its officers appealed against the order dated 23 June 2026 dismissing their review petition, which had sought review of a Single Judge’s order dated 2 May 2025 in WPS No. 5254 of 2017.

The State sought condonation of a 40-day delay in filing the writ appeal, attributing it to the time taken to obtain administrative approval.

The State had sought the Advocate General’s opinion on filing a review only on 25 March 2026; the opinion followed on 7–8 April 2026, sanction was granted on 5 May 2026, and the review petition was filed on 22 May 2026.

The respondents opposed condonation, arguing that the State had not acted diligently and that administrative approval did not constitute sufficient cause.

Whether the State showed sufficient cause to condone the 40-day delay in filing the writ appeal.

Whether time taken to obtain administrative approval justified condonation where the State had delayed for nearly a year in pursuing a challenge to the original order.

The Court relied on Postmaster General & Others v. Living Media India Limited & Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, for the principles that Government departments must discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment; condonation of delay is an exception, not a rule or an entitlement; and the law does not prescribe a different limitation period for the State.

The Court further held that time consumed in obtaining administrative approval, in the circumstances of this case, was not a ground to condone the delay.

Although the appeal was formally delayed by 40 days, the Court considered the State’s conduct from the date of the original order.

The State waited almost a year before seeking the Advocate General’s opinion on review, doing so only after contempt proceedings had been initiated; it then pursued review and, after that failed, adopted a similar approval process for the appeal.

The Court found the State had not been diligent in exercising its right to challenge the order and that administrative processing did not explain or excuse the broader delay.

The explanation was therefore insufficient under the principles in Postmaster General.

It dismissed I.A. No. 2 of 2026 and, consequently, dismissed the writ appeal as barred by limitation.