Administrative delay in inter-departmental file movement does not constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning inordinate delay.

The State filed a Criminal Leave Petition seeking to set aside a Trial Court judgment (SC No. 692/2017) which acquitted the respondent under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 of the IPC (penetrative sexual assault), while convicting him only under Section 10 of the POCSO Act (aggravated sexual assault).

The incident occurred in 2016 involving a 10-year-old victim.

The State's petition was filed with a delay of 541 days, attributed to administrative movement of files and the medical leave of the Additional Public Prosecutor.

1. Whether the State demonstrated "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone a delay of 541 days in filing the petition.

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in acquitting the respondent of penetrative sexual assault based on material improvements in the victim's testimony and lack of medical corroboration.

The court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that while "sufficient cause" requires liberal construction, it does not permit condoning inordinate, unexplained delays caused by routine administrative movement of files.

The court followed the precedent in State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (2026), holding that the Government must take responsibility for the omissions of its officers.

Regarding POCSO, the court scrutinized Sections 6 and 10 and the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30, balanced against the principle that material improvements in testimony (changing from "touching" to "penetration") at a belated stage require cautious scrutiny.

The Court found the State’s explanation for the 541-day delay to be a "lame excuse," noting that administrative inefficiency and inter-departmental correspondence do not constitute sufficient cause once valuable rights have accrued to the respondent.

On merits, the Court observed that the initial FIR and Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements only alleged "touching," whereas the allegation of "penetration" (digital rape) surfaced for the first time 14 months later in the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement.

The Court held this was a material improvement. Furthermore, the medical evidence (MLC) showed normal anal tone and no evidence of penetrative trauma.

The Court noted that the mother (PW-2) did not support the penetration claim and that the FIR was lodged only after subsequent personal quarrels between the mother and the respondent.

On merits, the Court held that the Trial Court’s view was a "reasonably plausible" interpretation of the evidence and that there was no manifest perversity in acquitting the respondent of the graver charges while maintaining the conviction under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

The Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay (Crl.M.A. 13696/2024) and the Criminal Leave Petition.