Administrative delays do not constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning delay in Section 37 arbitration appeals.

The appellant (PWD) challenged an arbitral award dated 21.02.2023, wherein the Arbitrator remanded a land acquisition compensation matter back to the Competent Authority (CALA) instead of re-determining the compensation under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956.

The District Court dismissed the appellant’s Section 34 challenge on 18.09.2024, observing the Arbitrator acted beyond his scope.

The appellant received the certified copy on 04.12.2024 and filed this Section 37 appeal on 25.01.2025.

The Registry calculated a delay of 38 days beyond the 90-day limitation period.

The appellant moved I.A. No. 2 of 2025 for condonation, citing administrative delays, counsel consultations, and the vacancy of the Executive Engineer’s post.

1. Whether the administrative and procedural delays cited by the State constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning a 38-day delay in an arbitration appeal.

2. Whether the strict timelines for disposal under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allow for liberal condonation of delay for government authorities.

The Court applied Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 regarding the condonation of delay.

It relied heavily on the Supreme Court precedent in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 460, which established that for appeals under Section 37, delay should be condoned only by way of exception and not as a rule, emphasizing the objective of speedy disposal.

The court also noted that even if "sufficient cause" is shown, condonation is a discretionary power, not a vested right of the appellant.

The Court found that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the 38-day delay beyond the prescribed 90-day period.

The reasons provided—administrative approvals, seeking legal opinion, transition of officers, and winter vacations—were deemed "vague and general" and "woefully short" of establishing sufficient cause.

Following the Borse Brothers mandate, the Court reasoned that in arbitration matters, the "short delay" can only be condoned if the party acted bona fide and without negligence.

The Court determined the appellant was negligent and that allowing such routine administrative excuses would defeat the statutory intent of the Arbitration Act to ensure swift resolution of disputes.

The Court also noted parity with its prior decision in Sumitra Bai v. Executive Engineer, PWD (ARBA No. 62 of 2025).

Consequently, the Arbitration Appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.