Administrative lethargy does not justify delay; belated writ petitions are liable to dismissal.

The Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 20 March 2023.

The writ petition was instituted on 20 July 2026, more than three years after the Tribunal’s order.

ESIC explained the delay by stating that there had been uncertainty regarding which office was competent to decide whether a writ petition should be filed, and that related litigation before the Tribunal was decided on 7 August 2025, after which ESIC Headquarters decided to institute the writ petition.

When questioned whether no ESIC authority had been competent to take the decision during the intervening period, counsel candidly stated that he could not make such a submission.

The High Court therefore considered the delay to be attributable to administrative lethargy.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine a challenge filed more than three years after the impugned order, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

2. Whether administrative uncertainty or lethargy within a State agency constitutes sufficient justification for overlooking delay and laches in filing a writ petition.

The Court applied the principle that delay and laches are relevant considerations when a High Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, and that a litigant who sleeps over its rights ordinarily should not receive extraordinary relief; delay may defeat equity and justify dismissal where the cause of action has been allowed to drift away.

This principle was drawn from Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215.

The Court also relied on Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, for the rule that administrative lethargy and laxity cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly where the State machinery fails to establish bona fides and continuous vigilance.

Consequently, constitutional courts should not relax procedural requirements for State agencies that have themselves caused the delay.

The impugned Tribunal order was dated 20 March 2023, whereas the writ petition was filed only on 20 July 2026, creating a delay exceeding three years.

ESIC’s explanation—that there was uncertainty over the competent office and that related proceedings concluded only on 7 August 2025—did not account for the entire period of delay.

The Court specifically tested whether ESIC’s explanation implied that no authority had been competent to decide on litigation throughout the period, and counsel was unable to make that assertion.

The Court consequently characterized the delay as administrative lethargy.

Applying the Supreme Court’s direction that such lethargy cannot ordinarily justify condonation and that delay and laches may independently warrant refusal of Article 226 relief, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

It held that the unexplained delay of more than three years, attributable to administrative lethargy, disentitled ESIC to relief under Article 226.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, without examination of the merits.

The connected applications were consequently not granted any substantive relief.