Administrative transfers cannot be judicially interfered with absent mala fides, jurisdictional incompetence, or perversity.

The petitioner, an employee of TANGEDCO serving as an Assessor at Manjakuppam, challenged the relieving/transfer order dated 16 October 2024 issued by the fourth respondent, transferring him from Manjakuppam to Nellikuppam.

The petitioner alleged that the fifth respondent acted with mala fide intention because, in an earlier writ petition, W.P. No. 29846 of 2024, the High Court had directed that he be permitted to rejoin duty; according to him, he was transferred immediately upon rejoining to circumvent that order.

The respondents contended that the transfer was made for administrative convenience, as the petitioner had remained absent during several periods and his absence had affected meter-reading work relating to more than 5,000 service connections in three regions.

The petitioner’s periods of absence were from 16 August 2023 to 13 September 2023, 19 September 2023 to 15 October 2023, 16 October 2023 to 15 December 2023, and 7 June 2024 to 17 June 2024; he was permitted to rejoin upon producing a medical fitness certificate.

Whether the impugned transfer order was issued with mala fide intent to circumvent the High Court’s earlier direction permitting the petitioner to rejoin duty.

Whether the administrative transfer could be interfered with in judicial review in the absence of proof that it was issued by an incompetent authority, without jurisdiction, or was otherwise perverse or mala fide.

The Court applied the principle laid down in Mrs. Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 532, that a Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at a particular place.

It also relied on The Director General, ESI Corporation v. Dr. K. Monicka, 2024 MHC 4091, which held that an administrative transfer may be challenged in writ jurisdiction only where it is issued by an incompetent authority lacking jurisdiction or is tainted by mala fides.

The Court further applied the principle that judicial review of an administrative transfer is limited and interference is warranted only where the order is perverse or legally unsustainable.

The Court found that the earlier order in W.P. No. 29846 of 2024 had been complied with because the petitioner was in fact permitted to rejoin duty at Manjakuppam.

Consequently, the subsequent transfer could not be treated as an attempt to evade that order merely because it occurred on the date of rejoining.

The petitioner’s prolonged periods of absence, even though stated to be on medical grounds, had left more than 5,000 service connections unattended across three regions and created administrative difficulties in recording meter readings.

The fifth respondent, being responsible for the relevant regions, was entitled to address those exigencies by deploying another employee and transferring the petitioner.

The Court therefore found sufficient administrative justification for the transfer and no substantiated mala fide intention, lack of jurisdiction, or perversity.

Since the petitioner had no vested right to remain posted at Manjakuppam and the transfer was supported by administrative exigencies, the impugned order dated 16 October 2024 was not amenable to interference under Article 226.

The writ petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.