Administrative Tribunals lack jurisdiction to set aside arbitral awards as they are not Principal Civil Courts.

The applicants, representing Pharmacists, sought pay scale upgradation from Rs. 4500-7000 to Rs. 5000-8000 effective from 01.01.1996

Following a disagreement in the National Anomaly Committee, the matter was referred to a Sole Arbitrator by the Tribunal via an order dated 13.03.2003, based on an agreed settlement mechanism

The Arbitrator issued an award on 13.03.2004 denying the upgradation

The applicants initially challenged this award before the Delhi High Court in W.P. 21248/2005, which was withdrawn on 18.10.2016 with liberty to pursue remedies before the appropriate forum after the High Court orally questioned the maintainability of a writ against an arbitral award when the Tribunal holds jurisdiction over service matters

Consequently, the applicants filed the present Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, to quash the award and grant the upgraded pay scales

1. Whether an "arbitral award" qualifies as an "order" as defined under the Explanation to Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

2. Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) constitutes a "Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, competent to set aside an arbitral award

3. Whether an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is analogous to an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which limits the Tribunal's jurisdiction to "orders" made by the Government or specific authorities

Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which exhaustively defines "Court" as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction

The court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors, which held that no court other than those specified in Section 2(1)(e) can entertain matters under Part I of the 1996 Act

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, emphasizing that while Tribunals are courts of first instance for service matters, they remain creatures of statute and cannot assume jurisdiction outside their parent Act

The Tribunal reasoned that for an O.A. to be maintainable under Section 19 of the 1985 Act, the grievance must stem from an "order" issued by a government body or officer.

An "arbitral award" does not fall within the statutory explanation of an "order" under Section 19

The Tribunal observed that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a special statute providing a specific, exclusive remedy under Section 34 for setting aside awards

Although the Tribunal exercises powers of a "court" in service matters, it does not satisfy the definition of a "Principal Civil Court" as required by Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act

The Bench concluded that even if the Arbitrator was appointed following a Tribunal order and a concession by the respondents, such a concession cannot confer "defective jurisdiction" upon the Tribunal to override the statutory mandate of Section 34 of the 1996 Act

Therefore, the mechanism for challenging an arbitral award remains distinct from the resolution of service grievances under the 1985 Act

The 1996 Act provides the overriding statutory framework for such challenges

Consequently, the Original Application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Pending M.A.s were disposed of, and no costs were awarded