Administrative workload and counsel’s failure to communicate did not justify condoning the prolonged appeal delay.

The appellant institution filed connected writ appeals with delays of 447 days and 252 days, respectively.

In support of condonation, its Director stated that he assumed charge on 28 February 2024, did not learn of the relevant writ proceedings’ disposal until later, had substantial clinical and administrative responsibilities, and encountered difficulty obtaining the case file and certified order.

The Court considered the explanations in the supporting affidavits and dismissed the applications to condone delay.

1. Whether the appellants established bona fide and sufficient reasons to condone the delays of 447 days and 252 days in filing the writ appeals

2. Whether the writ appeals could proceed after the applications for condonation of delay were dismissed

The Court applied the general principle governing condonation of delay: an appellant must provide a bona fide and sufficiently persuasive explanation for the delay, and court proceedings and limitation periods must be adhered to.

It stated that a party cannot wait until after the limitation period has expired to initiate proceedings.

The Court found that the explanations in the affidavits—including the Director’s workload, the institution’s lack of a legal section, and the time taken to obtain documents—were not bona fide, genuine, or sufficiently persuasive to justify the lengthy delays.

Emphasising that the institution’s authority did not excuse non-compliance with procedural timelines, it declined to condone the delays.

As a result, it dismissed both writ appeals without deciding their merits.