Administrative workload and unexplained inaction do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning inordinate delay.

The appellant, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Kolkata, sought condonation of a 1480-day delay in filing an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the respondent-company.

The impugned order was received by the appellant on 29 July 2021. The appellant contended that the department was not functioning properly during the COVID-19 period from 31 August 2021 to 6 February 2022 and relied on the Supreme Court’s suo motu orders extending limitation.

It further relied on departmental restrictions, voluminous records located on different floors, and the burden of handling numerous matters between 7 February 2022 and 18 April 2024.

The respondent opposed condonation, contending that even after giving the appellant the benefit of the COVID-related extension of limitation, an unexplained delay of 1116 days remained.

The Court also noted that the memorandum of appeal, stay petition and condonation application had been finalized and forwarded to the advocate on 24 September 2025, but the appeal was filed only on 15 December 2025, without any explanation for that further delay.

Whether the appellant had shown “sufficient cause” under Section 260A(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for condoning the 1480-day delay in filing the appeal?

Whether departmental workload, administrative difficulties, COVID-related restrictions and the handling of voluminous records constituted sufficient cause in the facts of the case?

Whether dismissal of the condonation application required dismissal of the tax appeal as time-barred?

Section 260A(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 requires an appeal to the High Court to be filed within 120 days from receipt of the order, while Section 260A(2A) permits admission after expiry of that period only where the Court is satisfied that sufficient cause prevented timely filing.

The Court applied the principle that “sufficient cause” should ordinarily receive a liberal, justice-oriented construction where there is no negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides.

However, relying on Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Court held that gross negligence, lack of bona fides, inordinate delay, unexplained inaction, and fanciful or concocted explanations are relevant considerations; inordinate delay warrants a stricter approach than a short delay.

The Court also relied on Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 INSC 1104, for the principle that the explanation for delay, rather than merely its arithmetical length, is decisive, and that courts must exercise caution where the delay is attributable to the applicant.

The Court held that the appellant’s explanation primarily attributed the delay to departmental pressure, the handling of numerous matters, administrative restrictions and difficulty in locating records.

Even after extending the benefit of the Supreme Court’s COVID limitation orders, the appellant failed to explain the remaining delay of 1116 days.

The general assertion that the department was overburdened was treated as a bald and inadequate explanation, not as sufficient cause under Section 260A(2A).

The unexplained interval between finalization of the appeal papers on 24 September 2025 and filing on 15 December 2025 further demonstrated a lack of due diligence.

Applying the principles in Esha Bhattacharjee and Shivamma, the Court found the appellant’s conduct lethargic, tardy and lacking in bona fides, and concluded that condoning the delay would not be justified.

The application for condonation of delay, GA No. 1 of 2026, was dismissed.

Consequently, the tax appeal, ITA No. 51 of 2026, was also dismissed as time-barred.

There was no order as to costs.