Admission of Will’s execution does not equate to admission of its genuineness or legality.

Late Sh. S.C. Roy was the absolute owner of suit property D-603, Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi. After his death in 1991, his wife, Smt. Kalyani Roy, mutated the property in her name based on his Will dated 15.03.1988.

Following litigation regarding her ownership, it was judicially settled that she held an absolute interest in the property.

Smt. Kalyani Roy died on 19.01.2017, allegedly leaving a Will dated 30.03.2016 bequeathing the property to her four children.

On 09.02.2022, during proceedings, counsel for Defendant No. 1 stated that his client "does accept" Smt. Kalyani Roy’s Will.

Consequently, the Plaintiffs moved an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC for a decree of partition based on this admission.

Defendant No. 1 contested the application, alleging the Will was manufactured under suspicious circumstances, the testatrix lacked English proficiency, and that the statement by counsel did not constitute a binding admission of the Will's genuineness.

1. Whether a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed solely on the basis of a counsel’s statement accepting the existence of a Will, despite subsequent challenges to its genuineness.

2. Whether an admission regarding the execution or "making" of a Will is synonymous with an admission of its legal validity and genuineness.

The Court applied Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC regarding judgments on admissions, noting that such admissions must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.

Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, mandate that a Will must be proved by at least one attesting witness even if the opposite party does not specifically deny execution in the pleadings.

The propounder must prove the testator’s sound disposing mind and the absence of suspicious circumstances, as established in Savithri v. Karthyayani Amma and Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena.

In S.R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, a distinction is drawn between admitting the "making" of a Will and admitting its "genuineness."

The Court reasoned that while the order dated 09.02.2022 recorded the Defendant's acceptance of the Will, this only amounted to an admission of the document's existence/making and not its legality or genuineness.

The Court observed that Defendant No. 1’s written statement expressly raised "suspicious circumstances," including the testatrix's lack of English proficiency and her frail health at the time of execution.

Applying the precedent from Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, the Court held that the mandate of Section 68 of the Evidence Act is not waived by a general admission; the propounder remains obligated to remove suspicious circumstances through trial.

Therefore, since the admission was not "unequivocal" regarding the Will's validity, the Plaintiffs could not bypass the requirement of a full trial.

The Court held that the Plaintiffs must prove the valid execution of the Will and discharge the onus of explaining the alleged suspicious circumstances through evidence.

The final order dismissed the application while leaving other submissions open for later adjudication.