Admitted signature triggers Section 139 presumption; unsubstantiated claims of blank cheque misuse cannot rebut it.

The petitioner (accused) sought to set aside concurrent judgments of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act passed by the Trial Magistrate and the First Appellate Court

The complainant alleged that the accused borrowed ₹7,00,000 in October 2018 and issued a cheque (Ex.P.1) for repayment, which was dishonored for "Funds Insufficient"

A statutory notice was served on the accused, but she neither replied nor complied

The accused, a school teacher, admitted her signature on the cheque but contended she borrowed only ₹1,00,000 and that the complainant misused a blank security cheque by filling in ₹7,00,000

1. Whether the Trial Court was justified in raising the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act when the accused pleaded that the instrument was inchoate under Section 20

2. Whether the oral testimony of the accused and her husband was sufficient to rebut the presumption of a legally recoverable debt

3. Whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, should interfere with the concurrent findings regarding the complainant’s lending capacity

The court applied Sections 20, 118, 138, and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

Section 118 presumes that every negotiable instrument was made for consideration, while Section 139 mandates a presumption that the holder received the cheque for the discharge of a debt or liability

The court relied on Rangappa v. Mohan and Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, which established that once the signature on a cheque is admitted, the presumption shifts the evidential burden to the accused to prove the non-existence of debt by a preponderance of probabilities

It further cited Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, affirming that revisional courts should not upset concurrent factual findings absent perversity

The court found that since the accused admitted her signature on Ex.P.1, the trial court correctly invoked the statutory presumption under Section 139

The burden of proof shifted to the accused to provide rebuttal evidence

The court noted that the accused (a teacher) and her husband (an Income Tax employee) failed to reply to the statutory notice despite service, which weakened their defense

The court characterized the defense of "misuse of a blank cheque" as "illusory and moonshine" because the accused took no legal action against the complainant for the alleged fraud

Following the ratio in Rajesh Jain, the court held that the focus must remain on the accused's failure to discharge the evidential burden rather than questioning the complainant's lending capacity once the foundational facts (signature and issuance) were established

The High Court found no jurisdictional error or perversity in the lower courts' findings

The revision petition was dismissed, and the orders of conviction and sentence (including the fine of ₹8,05,000) were confirmed