Admitted signatures trigger statutory presumptions; an unsupported security-cheque defence cannot rebut enforceable liability.

The revisionist challenged the judgment dated 6 November 2025 by which the Additional Sessions Judge, Rudrapur, dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 264 of 2025 and affirmed the conviction recorded by the Trial Court on 25 August 2025 in Criminal Case No. 11306 of 2022 for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”).

The Trial Court sentenced the revisionist to three months’ simple imprisonment and imposed a fine of ₹16,22,488, with a further one month’s simple imprisonment in default of payment.

The revisionist contended that the cheque had been issued as security in connection with a purchase order for thirty electrical panels and that the goods supplied were deficient in quantity and specifications.

It was further alleged that the goods were returned or rejected and that the complainant had been requested not to present the security cheque until the dispute was resolved.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Appellate Court granted bail but directed the revisionist to deposit 20% of the cheque amount before the Trial Court within two months.

Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act was sustainable despite the revisionist’s defence that the cheque was a security cheque issued in the context of a dispute concerning deficient goods.

Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act stood rebutted by the defence raised by the revisionist.

Whether the direction of the Appellate Court requiring deposit of 20% of the cheque amount warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction.

Section 138 of the NI Act imposes criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability, subject to fulfilment of the statutory requirements.

Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act create rebuttable presumptions that a negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

These presumptions may be displaced only by a probable and credible defence supported by cogent material.

In revisional jurisdiction, interference is warranted only where the impugned order suffers from illegality, perversity, material infirmity, or jurisdictional error.

The Court found that the cheque had been drawn by the revisionist, bore his admitted signatures, was presented within its validity period, and had been dishonoured.

Consequently, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act operated in favour of the complainant.

Although the revisionist relied on the alleged deficiency in the goods, their return or rejection, and the assertion that the cheque was issued as security, he failed to place cogent and credible material sufficient to rebut the statutory presumptions or establish the absence of a legally enforceable liability.

The Court further held that the revisionist had not demonstrated any legally sustainable ground or material showing that compliance with the Appellate Court’s deposit direction was impossible or would cause such prejudice as to justify revisional interference.

The impugned orders therefore disclosed no illegality, perversity, infirmity, or jurisdictional error.

It held that the conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act was legally sustainable, that the statutory presumptions had not been rebutted, and that no ground existed to interfere with the direction requiring deposit of 20% of the cheque amount.

The criminal revision was dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.