Advertisement under Section 20 follows acceptance; courts cannot direct publication before the Registrar accepts the application.

The appellant applied for registration of the trademark “OFFER” in Class 33 for “alcoholic beverages, except beers; alcoholic preparations for making beverages.”

The Senior Examiner rejected the application on 30 October 2025 under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, on the ground that the mark was a common surname, personal name, geographical name, ornamental or non-distinctive geometrical figure and was incapable of distinguishing the appellant’s goods.

The appellant challenged the rejection before the learned Single Judge under Section 91 of the Act.

The Single Judge held that the examination report reflected non-application of mind and applied a test of “uniqueness”, which was not contemplated by Section 9(1)(a). The rejection was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration of the distinctiveness of “OFFER” vis-à-vis alcoholic beverages, with a direction to decide the application within four months.

In the intra-court appeal, the appellant sought, inter alia, a direction to process the application and advertise the mark under Section 20 of the Act read with Rule 39 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

The respondent stated that the application was being reconsidered and that the appellant had been heard on 19 August 2026.

1. Whether the learned Single Judge erred in remanding the trademark application for fresh consideration instead of directing its acceptance, processing and advertisement under Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 39 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

2. Whether the Registrar could be directed to advertise the mark when the application had not yet been accepted.

3. Whether the remand order warranted interference in an intra-court appeal, having regard to the principle that remand should not be ordered routinely.

The Court applied Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which concerns marks devoid of distinctive character and does not prescribe “uniqueness” as the applicable test.

Section 20 provides that advertisement ordinarily follows acceptance of the trademark application, although the Registrar may advertise an application before acceptance in specified circumstances, including where Section 9(1) applies.

The Court also considered Section 91 of the Act governing appeals and relied on *Nadakerappa since deceased by L.Rs. v. Pillamma since deceased by L.Rs.*, AIR 2022 SC 1609, for the principle that remand cannot be ordered as a matter of routine; however, remand is permissible where justified by the nature of the controversy and the statutory procedure.

The Court held that the Single Judge had correctly found that the rejection was based on non-application of mind and on the legally irrelevant test of “uniqueness”, rather than an examination of whether “OFFER” was distinctive in relation to alcoholic beverages.

Since the application had not yet been accepted, the statutory stage for ordinary advertisement under Section 20 had not arisen.

The Registrar was the appropriate authority to assess the application at the initial stage, and the appellate court ought not to undertake that examination or direct acceptance itself.

The remand was reasoned, time-bound and consistent with the statutory scheme.

Further, the respondent had already reconsidered the application and heard the appellant, leaving no legal or factual error requiring appellate interference.

It upheld the Single Judge’s order remanding the application for fresh consideration under Section 9(1)(a), noting that advertisement under Section 20 follows acceptance and that the application had not reached that stage.

The pending applications were also disposed of.