Affidavit opportunity must be granted to contest condonation of delay regardless of merits of review.

The Appellant (plaintiff) filed a money suit (CS-COM/769/2024) against the Respondent bank.

During the suit's pendency, an interim order dated June 15, 2011, permitted the Appellant to obtain a refund of ₹8,41,500/- subject to executing an indemnity bond.

On April 30, 2025, the Trial Judge dismissed the suit but included a direction in the decree allowing the Appellant to withdraw said sum with interest.

The Appellant initiated execution proceedings; however, the Respondent filed a review petition (RVWO/8/2026) after a delay of 284 days.

The Trial Judge allowed the review and condoned the delay without granting the Appellant an opportunity to file an affidavit-in-opposition, citing that the error in the decree was "apparent on the face of the record".

1. Whether the Trial Judge erred in condoning a 284-day delay in a review proceeding without granting the opposing party an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit.

2. Whether the merits of a case (such as an error apparent on the face of the record) justify bypassing the procedural requirement to hear the opposing party on an application for condonation of delay.

The Court applied the principles of the Limitation Act, 1963, specifically Sections 3 and 5 regarding the condonation of delay.

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (2024) 12 SCC 336, which establishes that while Section 5 should be construed liberally to advance justice, the merits of the case are not to be considered when deciding an application for condonation of delay.

The rule dictates that the "sufficient cause" for delay must be examined independently of the underlying merits of the dispute.

The Division Bench observed that the Trial Judge had conflated the merits of the review (the "error apparent") with the reasons for the delay.

Under the Pathapati Subba Reddy doctrine, a court must decide a delay condonation application based on the parameters of "sufficient cause," "due diligence," and "negligence" rather than the perceived strength of the applicant's case on merits.

By refusing to allow the Appellant to file an affidavit-in-opposition to the delay application, the Trial Judge denied the Appellant a valuable legal right to contest the Respondent's explanations for the 284-day lapse.

While the Respondent argued that the fund belonged to depositors and the decree was erroneously worded, the Court held that procedural fairness required an opportunity for the Appellant to be heard on the limitation issue specifically.

The Court held that the Appellant must be afforded an opportunity to contest the application for condonation of delay.

The Appellant was directed to file an affidavit-in-opposition within seven days, with a reply from the Respondent due two weeks thereafter; the Trial Judge was requested to rehear the delay application and the review proceedings expeditiously; and the disputed funds shall not be released until the disposal of the review proceedings.