After Liquor Refusal Led To Fatal Axe Blow, Jharkhand HC Converts Murder Conviction To Culpable Homicide, Frees Man After Over 10 Years In Custody

On 22 December 2015, following a dispute after the deceased refused the appellant’s demand for liquor, the appellant struck the deceased on the head with an axe. The deceased died at the scene.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the incident occurred spontaneously and did not amount to murder; the State opposed the appeal.

The High Court considered the testimony of the eyewitnesses and the medical evidence, including the doctor’s description of the head injuries.

The Court applied Sections 299 and 300 IPC to distinguish culpable homicide from murder: culpable homicide requires an intention to cause death, an intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death, or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death; murder requires the applicable conditions under Section 300 to be established.

It also applied Section 304 Part I IPC, which prescribes punishment where culpable homicide not amounting to murder is committed with the intention of causing death or bodily injury likely to cause death.

The Court accepted the eyewitness evidence that the appellant struck the deceased on the head with an axe after the deceased refused his demand for liquor. It noted that there was no previous enmity or evidence that the appellant had come armed with an intention to assault the deceased; the incident arose from a sudden dispute.

The doctor described an incised wound and a lacerated wound on the head but did not state that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

On these facts, the Court found an intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death, but held that the ingredients of Section 300 IPC were not attracted; it therefore classified the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC.

Taking account of the period already spent in custody—stated by the Court to be more than 10 years and 10 months—it sentenced him to the period already undergone and directed his release forthwith, unless required in another case.

The appeal was partly allowed.