Age relaxation granted to 2009 recruitment applicants to participate in fresh selection after administrative delays.

The applicant, a 37-year-old candidate, sought to apply for the post of Grade-II (GNCTDSS)/Assistant Section Officer under Advertisement No. 01/2026.

This recruitment was a successor to a long-delayed process originally initiated via Advertisement No. 004/2009 for Grade-II (DASS)/Head Clerk.

The 2009 process remained inconclusive for nearly 17 years due to repeated litigation and administrative cancellations, including a notice dated 12.08.2025 that aborted a previous attempts to restart the process.

The applicant, having participated in the earlier stages, approached the Tribunal apprehending that she would be deprived of the opportunity to compete due to having become overage during the intervening period.

1. Whether candidates who applied for the original recruitment process in 2009 are entitled to age relaxation and participation in the fresh selection process initiated in 2026

2. Whether the principles of equity and legitimate expectation apply to candidates affected by prolonged administrative delays and litigation

The Tribunal primarily relied upon the precedent set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Ors. Vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) Anr., W.P. (C) No. 901/2025.

This judgment established that when a recruitment process is delayed for nearly two decades for no fault of the candidates, the court may exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to balance equities.

The principle mandates that such candidates be granted age relaxation to uphold their right of legitimate expectation and to ensure complete justice under Article 142 (as exercised by the Apex Court) and subsequent parity in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal observed that the controversy was squarely covered by the Supreme Court’s authoritative pronouncement in the Ajay Kumar case.

It noted that the applicants had been waiting to participate in the selection process since 2009, and the exercise had failed to progress beyond the notification stage until the fresh 2026 advertisement.

By applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Tribunal held that since the delay was attributable to the state’s "dilly-dallying conduct" and protracted litigation, candidates cannot be penalized with disqualification due to age.

The Tribunal linked the "limited relief" of age relaxation directly to the fact that the state was finally making a "serious attempt" to fill the posts via the 20.02.2026 notification.

The respondents were ordered to extend appropriate age relaxation in terms of the Supreme Court’s directions in W.P. (C) No. 901/2025. The holding clarified that this relief is conditional upon satisfying other eligibility criteria and does not confer an automatic right to appointment, which remains subject to merit. Candidates who were not part of the 2009 process were expressly excluded from the benefit of this order.