Allahabad High Court Quashes Case Against Husband, Finds Alleged Rape Narrative “Highly Improbable”

The applicant, Hirendra Kushwaha, challenged the summoning order dated 17 January 2023 and the criminal proceedings in Complaint Case No. 96681 of 2021, arising from allegations under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The complainant alleged that she married the applicant on 14 December 2015 and that matrimonial disputes arose because the couple had no child.

She alleged that she was taunted as a “barren woman”, that the applicant refused medical examination, and that on 23 November 2020 she was assaulted, confined, and allegedly raped by her father-in-law and brother-in-law.

The application under Section 156(3) CrPC was treated as a complaint, and the complainant’s statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC were recorded, including those of her mother and brother.

The Magistrate summoned only the applicant, while declining to summon the other two accused, observing that a prima facie case was made out against the husband under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC prima facie disclosed the essential ingredients of Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the applicant?

Whether the allegations concerning taunts regarding childlessness and the exchange of abusive remarks constituted “cruelty” under Section 498-A IPC or intentional insult under Section 504 IPC?

Whether the vague allegation of dowry demand, introduced in the complainant’s statement but absent from the complaint and the witnesses’ statements, was sufficient to attract Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act?

Whether the summoning order, which proceeded against the husband but not the other accused allegedly involved in the same incident, demonstrated sufficient judicial application of mind?

Whether continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, now corresponding to Section 528 BNSS?

The Court applied the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, now Section 528 BNSS, to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, proceedings may be quashed where, even accepting the allegations at face value, no offence is made out; where the uncontroverted allegations and supporting material do not disclose an offence; or where the prosecution is manifestly mala fide, vexatious or inherently improbable.

Section 498-A IPC requires “cruelty” falling within Explanation (a)—wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or physical or mental health—or Explanation (b), involving harassment connected with an unlawful demand for property or valuable security.

Section 504 IPC requires intentional insult accompanied by the intention or knowledge that it is likely to provoke a breach of peace or commission of another offence.

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act require material allegations relating respectively to giving, taking or abetting dowry, and demanding dowry.

The Court further relied on Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P. for the principle that summoning is a serious judicial act requiring application of mind.

The Court further relied on Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra on the ingredients of Section 504 IPC; Shobhit Kumar Mittal v. State of U.P., Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana concerning careful scrutiny of vague matrimonial allegations; and Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. and Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. concerning examination of attending circumstances and the substance of an apparently vexatious prosecution.

The Court held that it was not determining the truthfulness of the allegations, but only whether the complaint and preliminary evidence, taken as uncontroverted, disclosed the statutory ingredients of the offences.

The allegations primarily showed matrimonial discord arising from childlessness, with reciprocal insults: the complainant allegedly called the applicant impotent, while she was allegedly called a “barren woman”.

In the Court’s view, these allegations, without particulars showing conduct likely to drive the complainant to suicide, cause grave injury or endanger her health, or coercion connected with a dowry demand, did not prima facie satisfy Section 498-A IPC.

The abusive exchanges also lacked specific material showing the intention or knowledge required for Section 504 IPC.

The Court found no specific allegation in the complaint of giving, taking or demanding dowry.

The bald reference to dowry in the Section 200 statement was introduced after the main narrative, lacked details of the date, time, nature or quantum of the alleged demand, and was not supported by either witness under Section 202 CrPC.

Consequently, the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were not prima facie established.

The allegations of assault were considered vague and unsupported by particulars regarding injuries, medical examination, treatment or other contemporaneous material; the Court also noted that the same incident was attributed to the co-accused, who were not summoned, without any discernible reason for selectively summoning the applicant.

The allegation of criminal intimidation was treated as a consequential embellishment lacking an independent factual foundation.

Considering the overall circumstances, including the Court’s assessment that the prosecution narrative was inherently improbable and predominantly omnibus, continuation of the proceedings was found oppressive and an abuse of the criminal process.

It held that the complaint and preliminary statements did not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 498-A, 323, 504 or 506 IPC, or Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and that the Magistrate’s summoning order did not reflect adequate application of mind.

Exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS, the Court allowed the application, set aside the summoning order dated 17 January 2023, and quashed the entire criminal proceedings in Complaint Case No. 96681 of 2021, Nancy Verma v. Hirendra Kushwaha and Others, pending before the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Custom), Lucknow.