Allegation of meter tampering excludes Section 26(6) jurisdiction and precludes mandatory referral to the Electrical Inspector.

The petitioner, a partnership firm with an electrical installation of 400 KVA, was inspected by the respondent’s checking squad on November 1, 2003.

A panchnama was drawn alleging meter tampering, specifically noticing simple bolts instead of specialized ones and signs of cutting on the seal wire.

Laboratory testing revealed the meter ran 42.51% slow, leading to a supplementary bill of ₹99,00,827.40.

The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Committee, which partly allowed the appeal on August 2, 2004, reducing the load factor 'C' to 0.5 but confirming the finding of "electricity theft".

The petitioner challenged this order and the revised bill of ₹52,39,116.60 via this writ petition, contending the matter should have been referred to an Electrical Inspector under Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910, especially since the partners were later acquitted in a related criminal case.

1. Whether the dispute regarding alleged meter tampering and dishonest abstraction of energy falls under the jurisdiction of the Electrical Inspector under Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910.

2. Whether the acquittal of the petitioner's partners in a criminal trial for electricity theft is binding on the civil/administrative determination of the supplementary bill.

3. Whether the High Court can substitute its own findings for that of a technical Appellate Committee in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910, which governs disputes regarding the correctness or physical defects of a meter but excludes cases of tampering.

The Supreme Court precedent M.P.E.B. & Ors. v. Basantibai (AIR 1998 SC 23) clarified that disputes regarding "tampering" do not fall within the scope of the Electrical Inspector’s arbitration.

The Division Bench in Prakash Industries v. DGVCL (R/FA No. 2182/2019) held that once prima facie evidence of unauthorized artificial means for abstraction is shown, a rebuttable presumption of theft arises against the consumer.

Principle that the standard of proof in criminal proceedings (beyond reasonable doubt) differs from civil/administrative proceedings.

The court found that the site panchnama and laboratory report provided cogent evidence of tampering, including tampered bolts and internal wiring irregularities in the B-phase.

Applying Basantibai, the court reasoned that since the respondent’s case was built on "tampering" rather than a mere "faulty meter," Section 26(6) was inapplicable, and no referral to an Electrical Inspector was required.

The court noted that the Appellate Committee, comprising technical experts, had unanimously concluded electricity theft took place; therefore, the High Court would not interfere with such expert factual findings under Article 226.

Regarding the criminal acquittal, the court reasoned that the lower standard of proof in civil matters meant the administrative finding of theft could stand independently of the criminal court's verdict.

The court further held that the findings of an expert technical committee cannot be replaced by the court’s view in writ jurisdiction.

The Rule was discharged, and since the petitioner had already paid the revised bill in installments per previous interim orders, the respondent was directed not to demand further sums if no dues remained.