Allegation of misrepresenting proprietary concern as partnership firm fails to meet prima facie ingredients of cheating or forgery.

The Petitioner (original accused) and Respondent No. 2 (Complainant) entered into a partnership on 01.01.1990 under the name "M/s. S.R. Enterprises" to manufacture corrugated boxes.

The Petitioner also operated a pre-existing sole proprietorship of the same name, which held allotments for industrial sheds from the GIDC.

The Partnership Deed specified that the sheds belonged to the Petitioner and would only be utilized by the firm until dissolution.

Following the dissolution of the partnership in 2021, the Complainant filed a private complaint alleging that the Petitioner misrepresented the partnership as a proprietary concern to execute deeds and fabricated a 1999 Sale Deed with GIDC.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Merces, issued process on 11.08.2025 for offences under Sections 406, 417, 418, 420, 465, 466, 468, 471, and 473 of the IPC.

The Petitioner challenged this summoning order via a Writ Petition before the High Court.

1. Whether the averments in the complaint and the evidence recorded during the inquiry prima facie satisfy the ingredients of the alleged offences of cheating, criminal breach of trust, and forgery.

2. Whether the Trial Court’s summoning order was supported by adequate reasoning and a proper application of law to the facts.

The Court applied the principles governing the issuance of process under Section 204 of the CrPC (now Section 227 of BNSS, 2023) and the examination of complainants under Section 200 of the CrPC (now Section 223 of BNSS, 2023).

It relied on the fundamental ingredients of Cheating (Section 415/420 IPC), requiring fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the inception, and Forgery (Section 463/464 IPC), requiring the creation of a "false document".

The court further observed that for a summoning order to be valid, it must demonstrate a "process of reasoning" rather than mere reproduction of allegations.

The Court found that the allegations of misrepresentation were baseless because the Petitioner had held the proprietary concern since 1986, long before the partnership was formed.

A perusal of the Hire Purchase Agreements and the 1999 Sale Deed confirmed that the Petitioner signed as a "Proprietress" and not as a "Partner," thus no misrepresentation occurred.

Regarding forgery, the Court noted that the Complainant was a stranger to the Sale Deed, and the shed was never a partnership asset according to the Partnership Deed.

The deposition of the Sub-Registrar regarding "white ink" use was found a description of modern procedure rather than evidence of forgery or the creation of a false document by the Petitioner.

The Court emphasized that the complaint lacked specific averments regarding dishonest intention or wrongful loss.

Finally, it criticized the Trial Court for failing to assign any reasoning as to how the recorded evidence bridged the gap to the statutory ingredients of the alleged crimes.

It concluded that the dispute was essentially civil/commercial in nature, which the Complainant had already pursued in competent civil courts.

Consequently, the High Court quashed and set aside the summoning order dated 11.08.2025 and the resulting criminal proceedings. Rule was made absolute.