Allotted forest land constitutes self-acquired property, precluding ancestral claims by family members of the allottee.

The original plaintiffs (respondents) filed a suit for partition, declaration, and injunction regarding two sets of properties: 'Suit Property A' (forest land allotted to the plaintiffs' father by the Collector in 1997) and 'Suit Property B' (ancestral land).

The defendants (appellants) contested the suit, claiming that Property A, though allotted in the name of the plaintiffs' father, was jointly cultivated and partitioned during the lifetime of their respective fathers, who were brothers.

The Trial Court granted a preliminary decree in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The First Appellate Court confirmed this judgment.

The defendants approached the High Court in a Second Appeal, asserting rights over Property A based on joint cultivation and oral evidence.

1. Whether 'Suit Property A', being forest land allotted by the Government to an individual, constitutes self-acquired property or joint ancestral property.

2. Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership and possession in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.

Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which restricts Second Appeals to "substantial questions of law" rather than mere questions of fact.

The principle from Arunachala Gounder (Dead) v. Ponnusamy (2022) that land allotted by the Government to an individual qualifies as self-acquired property.

The standards for appellate interference established in Jaichand v. Sahnulal (2024) and Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth (2026), which stipulate that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse, contrary to mandatory provisions of law, or based on inadmissible evidence.

The Court observed that 'Suit Property A' was specifically allotted to the plaintiffs' father by the Collector under a Government Resolution dated 05.07.1972, and revenue entries (Entry No. 730) exclusively reflected his name since 1997.

The defendants failed to provide cogent evidence of joint cultivation or a prior legal partition that would override the official allotment and revenue record.

The Appellate Court noted that the defendants did not challenge the revenue entries for over two decades until 2019.

The High Court reasoned that since the allotment was a statutory act by the Collector, it vested exclusive title in the form of self-acquired property.

Applying the restrictive scope of Section 100 CPC, the Court found no perversity in the lower courts' appreciation of evidence and determined that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal in limine, affirming the concurrent findings of the Trial and lower Appellate Courts. The preliminary decree for partition and injunction stands.