An accused employee cannot claim TA or duty for attending their own criminal trial.

The applicant, a Transmission Executive posted at All India Radio, Bhuj, was required to attend CBI criminal proceedings in Ahmedabad as an accused.

The respondents initially granted her travelling allowance (TA) and treated her court-attendance periods as duty under orders dated 29 June and 15 October 2018. They later withdrew those benefits, stating that the relevant Government instructions under SR 153-A and SR 154 did not cover an employee attending trial as an accused.

After the applicant’s earlier OA was disposed of with liberty to make a representation, she submitted a representation seeking reconsideration and a personal hearing. The respondents rejected it by communications dated 9 and 15 October 2019, which she challenged in this OA.

1. Whether the applicant, who attended the CBI proceedings as an accused, was entitled under SR 153-A or SR 154 to TA and treatment of the attendance period as duty.

2. Whether the respondents could withdraw the benefits previously granted after concluding that they resulted from an erroneous interpretation of the rules.

3. Whether the withdrawal decision was vitiated by breach of natural justice or non-application of mind, including the refusal to grant a personal hearing.

The Tribunal applied the Government instructions under SR 154, which provide for treating a Government servant’s court attendance as duty when summoned to give evidence about facts learned in the discharge of public duties; it held that this does not cover attendance as an accused.

It read the relevant instructions under SR 153-A as concerning journeys to attend a Police/Special Police Establishment enquiry where the Government servant is suspected of involvement, and found no general entitlement to TA for attending one’s own criminal trial.

The Tribunal further applied the principles that an administrative authority may correct a benefit granted through an erroneous interpretation of the rules, but must act fairly where withdrawal has adverse civil consequences; natural justice does not invariably require an oral hearing if a fair written opportunity has been provided.

It also relied on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, for the principle that an administrative order must ordinarily stand on the reasons stated in it and cannot be supplemented by new reasons in later pleadings.

The applicant attended court as a charge-sheeted accused, not as a witness summoned to give evidence about official matters; nor did the applicable instructions establish a general TA entitlement for attendance at her own criminal trial. The fact that the proceedings arose from matters connected with her official duties, or that she was later acquitted, did not alter the capacity in which she attended court or enlarge the scope of SR 153-A or SR 154.

The Tribunal held that the earlier administrative orders did not create an indefeasible right to retain a benefit unsupported by the governing rules, and that the respondents could correct the error.

It found no procedural invalidity: the applicant had submitted a detailed written representation, which the respondents considered in a reasoned decision; an oral hearing was not mandatory in the circumstances. The impugned decision identified the applicable rules and explained why they did not cover her case.

The OA was dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs; pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were disposed of.