An acquittal cannot be disturbed unless the trial court’s findings are perverse or legally unsustainable.

The State sought leave to appeal under Section 378(III) read with Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. against the acquittal of the respondents of offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Section 498-A and Section 306 of the IPC, including the respective abetment/common-intention alternatives.

The State also sought condonation of a 132-day delay, attributing it to delays in processing and forwarding the proposal for appeal.

The deceased’s parents supported the prosecution, but her brother and maternal uncle did not; her elder sister and brother-in-law, who lived in the same village, were not called as prosecution witnesses.

The trial court found the prosecution evidence on the material point unreliable and acquitted the respondents on the benefit of doubt.

Whether the State showed sufficient grounds to condone the 132-day delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal disclosed an illegality or perversity warranting appellate interference.

Section 378(III) read with Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides the procedural basis for the State’s application for leave to appeal against acquittal.

In considering an acquittal, the appellate court may reassess the evidence, but should not disturb the acquittal unless the trial court’s findings are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, demonstrably unsustainable, or perverse; where two reasonable views are possible, the view favouring the accused should prevail.

The accused also benefit from a double presumption of innocence, strengthened by the acquittal.

The Court relied on Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225; Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110; and Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B., (2023) 6 SCC 605, including its reference to Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471.

The Court condoned the delay for the reasons stated in the State’s application.

On the merits, it noted that, although the deceased’s parents supported the prosecution, her brother and maternal uncle did not, and the elder sister and brother-in-law were not examined.

The trial court had assessed the relatives’ evidence and other testimony, found the material prosecution evidence unreliable, and given cogent reasons for extending the benefit of doubt.

Applying the principles governing appeals against acquittal, the High Court found no illegality or perversity warranting interference.

The Court dismissed the State’s petition for leave to appeal, finding the acquittal not fit for appellate interference.