An acquittal cannot be disturbed where the trial court’s view is reasonable and not perverse.

The State sought leave under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to appeal the respondent’s acquittal of charges under Sections 376(2)(n), 323 and 506 Part II of the IPC and Sections 6 and 7 of the Chhattisgarh Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005.

The prosecution alleged that the respondent forcibly had intercourse with the complainant on 25 December 2020 and again on 21 May 2021, after which she complained to police on 30 May 2021.

The trial court acquitted the respondent, relying in part on the complainant’s admissions concerning their continuing relationship, the absence of injuries, the negative FSL report and the delay in reporting.

The High Court condoned the State’s 535-day delay in filing the petition.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was so perverse or legally flawed as to warrant appellate interference and grant of leave under Section 378(3) CrPC.

Whether the State had shown sufficient grounds for the High Court to grant leave to appeal against the acquittal.

Section 378(3) CrPC requires leave of the High Court to appeal against an acquittal.

The court applied the principle that an appellate court should interfere with an acquittal only where the judgment suffers from patent perversity, misreads or omits material evidence, and no two reasonable views are possible—only a view consistent with guilt being reasonably available.

The court relied on Constable 907 Surendra Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 1147, para 12.

The relevant charged offences were under Sections 376(2)(n), 323 and 506 Part II IPC and Sections 6 and 7 of the Chhattisgarh Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005.

The High Court considered the complainant’s admissions that she had kept the respondent at her quarter, that they had travelled together, and that they had a physical relationship over approximately five to six months.

It held that these admissions and the surrounding conduct supported the trial court’s view that the relationship was consensual and did not establish that intercourse was forcibly obtained on the occasions alleged.

The medical examination disclosed no injuries, and the FSL report was negative; the Court considered this evidence alongside the complainant’s testimony and found no perversity or patent illegality in the trial court’s assessment.

Applying the limited-interference standard for acquittals, the Court found the trial court’s view to be a reasonable one.

It declined to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the CRMP in limine, without notice to the respondent.