Bona fide pursuit of an SLP is a relevant factor in condoning statutory appeal delay.

The petitioner challenged orders of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II (“DRT-II”) dated 28 and 29 April 2023 concerning evidence in a recovery proceeding.

After his writ petition challenging those orders was dismissed on 25 July 2023, this Court indicated that an appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (“DRAT”) filed within two weeks could be entertained without being influenced by delay.

The petitioner’s Special Leave Petition against that order was dismissed on 11 September 2023, and he filed the DRAT appeal on 30 September 2023, 19 days later.

The DRAT declined to condone the delay because the appeal was not filed within the two-week period and dismissed it.

The petitioner then filed the present writ petition.

Whether dismissal of the petitioner’s SLP at the threshold barred him from pursuing the present writ petition

Whether the DRAT erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal, given the petitioner’s pursuit of remedies and filing of the appeal 19 days after dismissal of the SLP

Section 20(3) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 requires an appeal to the DRAT to be filed within 30 days of receipt of the DRT order, but empowers the DRAT to entertain a late appeal where sufficient cause is shown.

Under Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, as approved in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376, dismissal of an SLP without grant of leave does not cause the challenged order to merge with the Supreme Court’s order and does not, by itself, bar a remedy otherwise available in law.

Time spent bona fide pursuing another remedy is a relevant circumstance when considering sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

The Court rejected the respondent’s maintainability objection because the SLP had been dismissed in limine without leave; that dismissal did not merge the earlier order with an order of the Supreme Court or independently preclude the writ petition.

On delay, the Court found that the petitioner had continuously pursued legal remedies, first before this Court and then before the Supreme Court, and had filed the DRAT appeal 19 days after the SLP’s dismissal.

The DRAT had focused on the expiry of the two-week period without properly considering those circumstances.

The petitioner’s diligence and stated age and ailments supported the conclusion that sufficient cause existed.

It condoned the delay and directed the DRAT to decide the appeal on its merits in accordance with law.

The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of.