An acquittal cannot be overturned merely because another reasonable view of the evidence is possible.

P.W.5, the complainant’s sister, married respondent No.1, Rafique Khan, on 12 July 1984 under Muslim rites and customs. The prosecution alleged that, before and at the time of marriage, the respondents demanded and received Rs.10,000 in cash, gold and silver ornaments, and other articles as dowry. After the marriage, P.W.5 was allegedly deserted when respondent No.1 left for employment at Tata and maintained an illicit relationship with another woman. It was further alleged that, on 18 January 1988, the other respondents demanded an additional Rs.15,000 for taking P.W.5 back to the matrimonial home, after which respondent No.1 sent her a letter of divorce and failed to return the dowry articles. The complaint was filed on 27 April 1988 under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The J.M.F.C., Cuttack convicted all the respondents under Section 4 of the Act and additionally convicted respondent No.1 under Section 6, sentencing them to imprisonment and fines. The 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, allowed the respondents’ appeal on 7 December 1994, reversed the convictions, and acquitted them after finding material inconsistencies, omissions, and improbabilities in the prosecution evidence.

The complainant thereafter filed the present appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; its maintainability had earlier been upheld by the High Court.

1. Whether the appellate court’s acquittal of the respondents for offences under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was perverse, unreasonable, or based on misappreciation or omission of material evidence so as to warrant interference in an appeal against acquittal.

2. Whether the evidence regarding the alleged demands of Rs.10,000 at the time of marriage and Rs.15,000 on 18 January 1988 proved the statutory offences beyond reasonable doubt.

3. Whether the complainant’s appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. was maintainable.

The Court applied Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, concerning demanding dowry and failure to transfer or return dowry property, along with Section 8A regarding the evidentiary burden under the Act.

It also applied the principles governing appeals against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C.: an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence; although the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, it should not interfere where two reasonable views are possible and the acquittal represents a possible view.

Interference is justified only where the finding is perverse, clearly unreasonable, impossible, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where compelling and substantial reasons demonstrate that guilt was the only possible conclusion.

These principles were drawn from Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 67; Ballu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 12 SCC 202; H.R. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, 2023 INSC 858; and Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104.

The Court also recognised that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The High Court treated the matter as an appeal against acquittal and examined whether the Sessions Court’s assessment of the evidence was perverse or unsustainable.

The Sessions Court had identified material weaknesses in the prosecution case: inconsistencies regarding the date and place of the alleged Rs.15,000 demand; uncertainty about whether P.W.1 could have witnessed the incident; the admission that respondent No.1 was not present on the relevant date; contradictions concerning the identity of the persons allegedly making the demand; non-production of the earlier complaint allegedly submitted to the Dowry Prohibition Cell and the Superintendent of Police; and inconsistent testimony regarding attempts to bring P.W.5 back to the matrimonial home.

P.W.5 was not present when the marriage was settled and was not herself an eyewitness to the alleged demand.

The High Court held that, even if the trial court’s view was possible, the Sessions Court had also adopted a detailed and reasonable view based on the record.

Since the appellant could at most establish that an alternative assessment of the evidence was possible, the heightened standard applicable to an appeal against acquittal was not satisfied.

The mere possibility of another view did not justify appellate interference with the acquittal.

Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal was dismissed and the judgment dated 7 December 1994 acquitting the respondents was affirmed.