An acquittal cannot be reversed where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible.

The prosecution alleged that the respondent, an FDA in the District Treasury, demanded and accepted ₹2,000 from the complainant, a Kannada Educator, in connection with processing arrears of salary increments.

The Lokayukta conducted a trap and charged the respondent under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Trial Court acquitted him, finding material inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence and doubt about his role in processing the bill. The Lokayukta appealed against the acquittal

The alleged offences were governed by Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

In an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but the acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence. Where the Trial Court’s view is a possible view on the evidence, it cannot be displaced merely because another view is possible; interference is warranted where the acquittal is perverse, material evidence has been misread or omitted, and the evidence permits no reasonable conclusion other than guilt. The Court relied on Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433; Babu Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581

Applying the appellate standard, the Court found no legal or factual error in the Trial Court’s assessment. The complainant, shadow witness and other panch witness gave materially inconsistent accounts concerning the demand, trap and mahazars; the panch witnesses also signed the trap and entrustment mahazars at the Lokayukta office rather than at the scene.

The evidence further cast doubt on the respondent’s role in the bill, including testimony that he was not its case worker and had raised no objection to it. Taken together, these matters supported the Trial Court’s view that demand and acceptance of a bribe had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that view was a possible one and did not justify appellate interference

The Trial Court’s acquittal of the respondent was left undisturbed