An acquittal must stand where impersonation rests on suspicion without reliable identification evidence.

The State appealed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi’s judgment dated 18 August 1999 acquitting Mahendra Singh of offences under Sections 419 and 420 IPC, and Ummed Singh of offences under Sections 419, 420 and 120-B IPC.

The prosecution alleged that Ummed Singh impersonated Mahendra Singh in a constable recruitment examination. Its case relied on discrepancies between photographs in recruitment and education records and on conflicting dates of birth.

The trial court found the prosecution had not proved that Ummed Singh appeared in the examination in Mahendra Singh’s name or that Mahendra Singh procured his participation.

Whether the acquittal was so perverse, manifestly erroneous, or based on misappreciation of evidence as to warrant appellate interference.

Whether the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ummed Singh impersonated Mahendra Singh, that Mahendra Singh participated in the alleged fraud, and that Ummed Singh conspired with him.

Under Sections 419 and 420 IPC, the prosecution had to prove the alleged personation and the ingredients of cheating, including dishonest inducement attributable to the accused; a charge under Section 120-B IPC required proof of an agreement to commit the alleged illegal act.

The prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for proof.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappraise the evidence, but the acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence; where the trial court has adopted a reasonably possible view, it should not be displaced merely because another view is available. The Court relied on Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided 12 February 2024.

The Court found that no witness who saw or supervised the examination or interview identified Ummed Singh as the candidate who appeared in Mahendra Singh’s name, and the photograph relied on by the prosecution was not reliably identified as Ummed Singh’s.

The date-of-birth discrepancy and differing photographs raised suspicion but did not establish the identity of the impersonator or connect Mahendra Singh to an arrangement to secure recruitment through another person.

Because the trial court’s assessment was a plausible view of the evidence and disclosed no material error, the applicable principles governing appeals against acquittal did not permit interference.

Finding no perversity or other compelling ground to interfere, it dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed the acquittals.

The respondents were not required to surrender; any process issued against them in connection with the appeal was to be withdrawn, and the trial court record was to be returned.