MHADA-authorised Executive Engineers can initiate summary eviction proceedings to facilitate redevelopment, Bombay High Court rules

The petitions concerned redevelopment of Issa Building, a dilapidated building in Mumbai comprising 83 residential and non-residential units, under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control and Promotion Regulations, 2034.

The owners had obtained permissions, and approximately 57 occupants had surrendered possession and executed Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs).

The petitioners, a minority group of occupants, challenged proceedings and eviction notices under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA Act).

They alleged that the owners had not complied with conditions in the No Objection Certificate (NOC), including requirements concerning PAAAs, area entitlement, corpus fund and a construction-cost bank guarantee; they also argued that the Executive Engineer lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings.

The respondents maintained that the Executive Engineer was authorized and that the relevant NOC conditions had been met, offered, or were not yet due.

Whether the proceedings initiated by the Executive Engineer under Section 95A of the MHADA Act were without jurisdiction or contrary to the Act’s scheme.

Whether alleged non-compliance with NOC conditions made the Section 95A proceedings premature or illegal.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides for summary eviction where the statutory prerequisites for redevelopment are met, including the prescribed level of occupant consent and issuance of an NOC; the NOC holder must make temporary accommodation available or pay rent in lieu, and the Board may effect summary eviction where an occupant refuses to vacate.

Sections 16 and 18 establish an administrative structure through which the Board performs its statutory functions, including through its Chief Officer and authorized officers; Section 181 concerns delegation of powers exercisable by the Authority and does not, by itself, require every Board function to be exercised by the Board collectively.

The principle *delegatus non potest delegare* applies subject to contrary indications in the statute’s language, scope or object.

The Court also relied on *Radhika George v. MHADA*, which characterizes Section 95A as a summary mechanism rather than a forum for full adjudication of redevelopment disputes, and distinguished *Javed Abdul Rahim Attar v. MHADA* and *Jugraj Tejraj and Sons v. Executive Engineer* on their facts and issues.

The Court found that the Executive Engineer had not assumed jurisdiction unilaterally: the Board had issued an administrative order assigning Section 95A actions to that office, and the Chief Officer had specifically authorized the action in this case; those orders were not challenged.

Reading Sections 16 and 18 together, the Court held that the Chief Officer formed part of the Board’s administrative machinery and that implementation of Board functions did not require a fresh collective resolution for each step.

As to the NOC, the Court accepted the statutory authorities’ affidavits that the relevant conditions either had been complied with, had been offered but not accepted, or were obligations falling due at a later stage—for example, the 10% rehabilitation-cost deposit was due before demolition, which had not commenced, and the PAAAs were to be submitted before a later plinth-level approval.

It therefore found no present breach warranting the invalidation of the Section 95A proceedings, while noting the authorities’ undertaking to enforce the NOC conditions and take action for any established breach.

It dismissed all the writ petitions, discharged the rule and made no order as to costs; it also expected the authorities to ensure compliance with the NOC conditions.