An ad hoc authority cannot impose dismissal, a major penalty, under the CCS (CCA) Rules.

The applicant, a Postal Assistant appointed by the Superintendent of Post Offices, Ambala Division, was served with a major-penalty charge-sheet under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging misappropriation of ₹66,000 in five accounts.

An Inquiry Officer was appointed, and the inquiry report dated 19.01.2017 found the charges proved.

The applicant did not submit his representation against the inquiry report within the time granted, citing family circumstances.

On 23.05.2017, the Superintendent of Post Offices, Ambala, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service.

The applicant’s revision petition was rejected by the Chief Postmaster General on 09.05.2018, and his review petition was rejected on 19.02.2020.

The applicant subsequently obtained information under the RTI Act indicating that the officer who had issued the charge-sheet and imposed the dismissal penalty was functioning as Superintendent of Post Offices in the JTS cadre on an adhoc basis and had not been regularly promoted to Group ‘A’.

He challenged the disciplinary, revisional and review orders before the Tribunal, principally alleging lack of competence of the disciplinary authority and violation of natural justice.

The respondents maintained that the adhoc officer was competent under Rule 13(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and that the disciplinary proceedings were otherwise valid.

1. Whether an officer functioning as Superintendent of Post Offices in the JTS cadre on an adhoc basis was competent to impose the major penalty of dismissal upon the applicant.

2. Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by a discrepancy between the charge-sheet, which alleged misappropriation of ₹66,000 in five accounts, and the respondents’ subsequent assertion of misappropriation of ₹2,75,000 in twenty-seven accounts, without giving the applicant an opportunity to answer the additional allegations.

3. Whether the dismissal, revisional and review orders were liable to be quashed on account of the alleged incompetence of the disciplinary authority and breach of natural justice.

The Tribunal applied Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, governing major-penalty disciplinary proceedings, and Rule 13(2), which permits an authority competent to impose a minor penalty to institute proceedings for a major penalty, notwithstanding its lack of power to impose the major penalty itself.

It also relied on Rule 43 of the P&T Manual, Volume III, under which no major penalty may be imposed by an authority lower than the appointing authority, together with the accompanying note stating that the prescribed appointing authorities possess the statutory power to impose penalties, subject to the applicable delegation scheme.

Relying on Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath, 2013 (4) SCT 507, the Tribunal held that disciplinary action must be initiated and imposed by a legally competent authority and concluded that an adhoc authority could not exercise the relevant statutory disciplinary power.

It further applied the principle that an order passed in breach of natural justice is a nullity, relying on Krishan Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1994) 27 ATC 594.

The respondents’ authorities on limited judicial review of punishment—Union of India v. Himmat Singh Chahar, AIR 1999 SC 1980, and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625—were held inapplicable on the facts.

The Tribunal found that the applicant’s appointing authority was the Superintendent of Post Offices, Ambala, but that both the officer who had issued the charge-sheet and imposed the dismissal penalty and the officer involved at the appellate stage were functioning in the JTS cadre on an adhoc basis rather than as regularly appointed Group ‘A’ officers.

It distinguished the respondents’ reliance on Rule 13(2), holding that although an authority may in certain circumstances institute proceedings for a penalty beyond its own competence, the dismissal penalty itself had to be imposed by a duly competent statutory authority.

The Tribunal treated the distinction between an appointment order and a penal order as material: the fact that an adhoc officer had signed the applicant’s appointment order did not establish competence to impose dismissal.

Independently, the Tribunal noted that the charge-sheet referred to ₹66,000 allegedly misappropriated in five accounts, whereas the respondents later relied on alleged misappropriation of ₹2,75,000 in twenty-seven accounts.

Since the applicant had not been given an opportunity to explain the allegations relating to the remaining accounts, the Tribunal held that the proceedings also violated natural justice.

Accordingly, it quashed and set aside the dismissal order and the revisional order dated 09.05.2018.

The Tribunal allowed the Original Application, with no order as to costs, while permitting the competent authority, if considered appropriate, to take fresh action concerning the alleged misconduct in accordance with law, subject to completion within six months from the date of the order.