An appeal cannot be withdrawn after the appellate authority has rendered its decision.

The applicant, a Loco Pilot/Goods in the Southern Railway, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings for stopping a goods train at Perinad despite a run-through signal and refusing to continue working for an additional two hours.

By order dated 11 February 2025, the disciplinary authority imposed compulsory retirement with full pensionary benefits.

The applicant filed an appeal on 14 February 2025, but subsequently submitted an application dated 7 July 2025 seeking withdrawal of the appeal.

The appellate authority rejected the withdrawal request on the ground that the appeal had already been finally decided and that the applicable Rules did not permit cancellation or alteration of a speaking order once officially recorded.

The appellate order, signed and approved on 25 June 2025, modified the penalty to reduction to the post of Assistant Loco Pilot in Pay Level 2, with reduced pay, and treated the intervening period as dies non.

The applicant challenged the rejection of withdrawal and the appellate order before the Tribunal.

Upon examining the original appeal file, the Tribunal found that the appellate decision had been approved and signed before the withdrawal application was submitted.

1. Whether the applicant was entitled to withdraw his departmental appeal after the appellate authority had already decided it on merits, though the order had not yet been dispatched or communicated to him.

2. Whether the appellate authority was legally competent to cancel, alter, or reconsider the appellate order after it had been recorded and approved on file.

3. Whether the rejection of the withdrawal request and the appellate order were liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal applied the Railway Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, particularly the principle that an aggrieved employee may pursue the available revisional remedy but cannot seek withdrawal of an appeal after its decision has been rendered.

It distinguished Bijayananda Patnaik v. Satrughna Sabu & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1566, which recognises an unconditional right to withdraw an appeal while it remains pending, from the present case where the appeal had already been decided.

It also relied on State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594, which holds that a quasi-judicial authority becomes functus officio when its order is pronounced, published, notified, or communicated; however, an order merely recorded in an office file may be altered before that stage.

The Tribunal further noted that the power of review must be specifically conferred by statute or rules and that no such power was available to the appellate authority in the circumstances of the case.

The Tribunal held that the decisive fact was not the date of dispatch or communication but that the appellate authority had already taken, approved, and signed its decision on 25 June 2025, whereas the withdrawal application was dated 7 July 2025.

Accordingly, the appeal was no longer pending when withdrawal was sought.

The principle in Bijayananda Patnaik was inapplicable because it concerned withdrawal before adjudication, whereas the applicant sought withdrawal after a decision on merits.

Although S.N. Goyal recognises that an uncommunicated office noting may sometimes be altered, the applicant was not seeking correction or review of an undecided office note; he sought to withdraw the appeal after the appellate decision had been finalised.

In the absence of an express power of review under the applicable Rules, the appellate authority could not reconsider or cancel the order merely because it had not yet been dispatched.

The applicant’s failure to pursue the available revisional remedy further supported dismissal of the challenge.

It held that an appeal may be withdrawn before a decision is rendered, but not after the appellate authority has decided it on merits and recorded and approved the decision.

The rejection of the withdrawal request was therefore valid, and the appellate order modifying compulsory retirement to reduction in rank and pay was not liable to be quashed.

The Original Application was dismissed, with no order as to costs.