An appellate court cannot reverse acquittal where the trial court’s evidence-based view is reasonably possible.

The prosecution alleged that on the night of 25 April 2015, the approximately 16-year-old prosecutrix went missing while sleeping with her mother in the courtyard of their house.

Her father initially suspected that Rakesh Kushwaha had taken her away. A missing-person case was registered, and after the prosecutrix was traced on 3 May 2015, she allegedly stated in her Section 164 CrPC statement that Rakesh, Munna Pal, and others had kidnapped her.

Following investigation, the respondent was charged under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. The prosecution examined ten witnesses and produced documentary evidence, while the defence also adduced documents.

The Third Additional Sessions Judge, Nagod, acquitted the accused by judgment dated 11 November 2022.

The State therefore filed an appeal under Section 378(1) CrPC, along with an application seeking leave to appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 IPC.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse, wholly unreasonable, or based on a misreading or omission of material evidence so as to warrant appellate interference under Section 378(1) CrPC.

Whether the State was entitled to leave to appeal against the order of acquittal.

The Court applied Sections 363 and 366 IPC concerning kidnapping and kidnapping or abduction of a woman for specified unlawful purposes, and Section 378(1) CrPC governing an appeal against acquittal.

It reiterated that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and that an appellate court may reappreciate evidence but should interfere only where the trial court’s view is perverse, wholly unreasonable, based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible.

If the trial court’s view is a legally plausible view, the existence of an alternative view does not justify reversal.

These principles were drawn from H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 561, and Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544.

The Court found material inconsistencies and omissions in the evidence of the prosecutrix, her father, mother, and uncle.

The alleged forcible entry, pressing of the mother’s mouth, use of weapons or a substance causing unconsciousness, and taking away of the father’s mobile phone were not mentioned in the FIR or earlier statements and were unsupported by seizure of any weapon, substance, cloth, or mobile phone.

The FIR was lodged on 30 April 2015, five days after the alleged occurrence, and the delay was not satisfactorily established by documentary or other reliable evidence.

The prosecutrix also stated that she was taken to several places and to Satna Police Station, where she was conscious, but did not make any complaint to the police, GRP, or other authority; the prosecution offered no satisfactory explanation for this conduct.

Considering the contradictions, material improvements, absence of independent corroboration, and prior rivalry between the parties, the Court held that the trial court’s assessment of the evidence was a possible and legally sustainable view.

Consequently, the stringent principles governing reversal of acquittal were not satisfied.

The application for leave to appeal, I.A. No. 7548/2023, was dismissed, and the State’s criminal appeal was consequently dismissed.