An application is premature where six months have not elapsed after filing the departmental representation.

The applicant, Pradeep Kumar, a Primary Teacher with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), sought grant of the first and second financial upgradations under the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme, along with consequential pay fixation, arrears, interest, and appropriate seniority fixation.

He had submitted representations dated 10 January 2022 and 23 December 2025 concerning the grant of MACP benefits, but the respondents had not passed any decision on them.

The respondents objected that the Original Application was barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

During the hearing, the applicant confined his prayer to a direction requiring the competent authority to decide his pending representation dated 23 December 2025 by a reasoned and speaking order.

Whether the delay, if any, in filing the Original Application should be condoned where the claim for MACP-related financial benefits gives rise to a recurring cause of action?

Whether the Original Application was premature or otherwise barred for failure to exhaust departmental remedies under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, particularly when the applicant’s representation dated 23 December 2025 remained undecided?

Whether the competent authority should be directed to consider and decide the applicant’s pending representation regarding grant of first and second MACP benefits?

The Tribunal applied Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which ordinarily requires exhaustion of available departmental remedies before an application is admitted and treats a representation as exhausted where no final order has been passed within six months.

The Tribunal also considered Section 21 of the Act in relation to limitation.

Relying on M.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 628, and Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, it reiterated that non-payment of proper salary or continuing service-related monetary deprivation may constitute a recurring cause of action, subject to the applicable principles of limitation.

The Tribunal further relied on its decisions in Meer Singh v. Union of India & Ors., O.A. No. 1634/2016, Paramjit Kaur v. Union of India, O.A. No. 3358/2014, and Devi Dutt Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., O.A. No. 3920/2012, for the principle that Section 20 imposes not only an obligation on the employee to pursue departmental remedies but also a corresponding obligation on the department to decide pending representations.

The Tribunal held that the applicant’s claim concerning grant of MACP benefits affected his monthly emoluments and therefore involved a recurring cause of action under the principles stated in M.R. Gupta and Tarsem Singh.

Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was allowed.

On the Original Application, the Tribunal noted that the representation dated 23 December 2025 was pending and that six months had not elapsed from its submission.

Applying Section 20(2)(b), the Tribunal treated the matter as premature insofar as the applicant had not yet exhausted the statutory departmental-remedy mechanism.

However, Section 20 also imposed a corresponding obligation upon the respondents to consider and decide the representation.

Since no decision had been communicated, and the applicant ultimately restricted his relief to consideration of the representation, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to issue a limited procedural direction without examining the merits of the MACP claim.

Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the applicant’s entitlement to first and second MACP benefits, it directed the competent authority among the respondents to consider and decide the applicant’s representation dated 23 December 2025 by a reasoned and speaking order within six weeks from receipt of a certified copy of the order.

The applicant was granted liberty to approach the Tribunal again if he remained aggrieved after receiving the decision on his representation.

The Original Application was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.