A plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) where limitation involves mixed questions of fact and law.

D. Chorei died on 18 December 1991, leaving behind, inter alia, the revision petitioner Anthony Chorei and the respondent D. Jack as legal heirs.

The respondent instituted Original Suit No. 3 of 2022 seeking declaration of title over a 60 × 70 feet plot, setting aside of a mutation order dated 9 July 2015, cancellation of related sale documents, and injunctive reliefs.

After pleadings were completed, the trial court framed four issues, including whether the suit was barred by limitation.

The trial court allowed the application and rejected the plaint on 21 August 2024.

In appeal, the first appellate court set aside that order on 9 July 2026 and directed the trial court to proceed with the suit, holding that limitation involved mixed questions of law and fact.

Whether the first appellate court could examine and set aside the order rejecting the plaint when no decree had been drawn up and the appeal had been presented under Section 96 read with Section 151 of the CPC?

Whether the suit was ex facie barred by limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act so as to warrant rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC?

Whether the respondent could claim exclusion of the time spent prosecuting the earlier writ petition under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and whether the relevant date for limitation was itself a disputed question of fact and law?

The Court applied Section 96 and Section 151 of the CPC, holding that an incorrect citation of a statutory provision is not fatal where the court’s power is otherwise traceable to law.

It considered Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, under which a plaint may be rejected only where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint itself to be barred by law; the plaint must be read as a whole, without adding to or subtracting from its pleadings, subject to admitted documents.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandates dismissal of a time-barred suit even if limitation is not pleaded, while Section 14 permits exclusion of time spent prosecuting proceedings in good faith before a court lacking jurisdiction or otherwise unable to entertain them.

Article 58 prescribes three years for a suit seeking a declaration, commencing when the right to sue first accrues.

The Court also noted that limitation may constitute a mixed question of law and fact, and that mutation does not confer title.

The Court rejected the objection concerning the form of the appeal.

Although no decree had been drawn up and the appeal was styled under Section 96 read with Section 151 CPC, the first appellate court was not deprived of jurisdiction to examine the trial court’s order; at most, the case involved an incorrect citation of the enabling provision.

On limitation, the Court found that the plaint did not, on its face, establish an absolute bar.

The respondent had pleaded not only the 9 July 2015 mutation order but also the subsequent writ proceedings initiated in 2018, their disposal on 19 March 2020, and the unsuccessful mediation process.

Whether the mutation order was the date on which the right to sue first accrued, and whether the respondent was entitled to exclusion under Section 14, required factual and legal examination.

These matters could not properly be conclusively determined under Order VII Rule 11(d) solely from the plaint.

The trial court had already framed limitation as Issue No. 3, which could be decided after trial.

It further held that limitation was not demonstrably apparent from the plaint and involved mixed questions of law and fact, including the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The trial court was directed to proceed with the suit and decide all issues, particularly limitation, independently and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by either the appellate order or the High Court’s order.

The civil revision petition and the connected miscellaneous case were dismissed, with no order as to costs.